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Initial coin offerings (“ICOs”) typically use blockchain technology to offer tokens that confer various
rights in return, most often, for cryptocurrency. They can be seen as a conjunction of crowdfunding and
blockchain. Based on a database of over 1000 ICO “whitepapers,” we provide a taxonomy of ICOs to
increase understanding of their many forms, analyze the various regulatory challenges they pose, and
suggest the steps regulators should consider in response. As our database shows, ICOs emerged very rapidly
as a global phenomenon and the global ICO market is much larger than generally thought, with overall
ICO subscriptions estimated to exceed $50 billion as of the year-end of 2018. The U.S. ICO market is
significant, but the United States does not dominate this market by any means. This groundbreaking
research demonstrates how many ICOs are offered on the basis of utterly inadequate disclosure of informa-
tion—more than two thirds the ICO whitepapers are either silent on the issuing entity, initiators or
backers, or they do not provide contact details. We also establish how an even greater share of ICOs do not
elaborate on the applicable law, segregation or pooling of client funds, or the existence of an external
auditor. Accordingly, the decision to invest in them often cannot be the outcome of a rational calculus.
Hallmarks of a classic speculative bubble were certainly present across 2017 and 2018. Nonetheless, ICOs
can also be seen as a response to the market failure of most financial systems to finance adequately the
exceptionally innovative start-up enterprises. ICOs have the potential to provide a new, innovative, and
potentially important vehicle for raising funds to support innovative ideas and ventures, and aspects of
their underlying structure may well prove to have an important impact on fundraising systems and struc-
tures long into the future.
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Introduction
More than 5000 Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) have raised significant
funds since 2016.1 Our data in this article suggest global contributions to
ICOs have surpassed $50 billion,2 and that ICOs have become a truly global
phenomenon. There was remarkable investor appetite in 2018 despite the
collapse in the price of Bitcoin and other major cryptocurrencies, with more
funds raised in the first eleven months of 2018 than in the previous four
years combined.3 The first “mega ICO” took place in early 2018: Telegram
raised over $1.7 billion,4 with Block One unexpectedly raising $4.1 billion
for its EOS project in a year-long ICO that culminated in June 2018.5
Compared to their current profile, ICOs came from very humble roots:
ICOs initially began as a mechanism among the blockchain community to
attract financial support for new ideas and initially involved small amounts
of money and small numbers of investors. However, as amounts raised in-
creased, so has interest in using ICO structures to raise money for ever
broader purposes among ever broader groups of investors, with issuances in
2017 and 2018 forming a large portion of early stage fundraising globally.6
However, the history of the technique’s evolution matters. In the early
phases of the ICO phenomenon, investors in ICOs typically personally knew
the technologists who were seeking funding to develop their software ideas
and to bring them to the market. For this reason, information about the
promoters and technologists behind the entity raising the funds and finan-
cial information about the entity were often totally absent. This paucity of
information became something of a market norm. While it made some sense
when everyone knew each other—for example in the cases of a range of
1. Per Feb. 15, 2019, the website ICORating listed 5223 ICOs, the website TrackICO listed 4170
ICOs and the website ICObench listed 5320 ICOs. ICObench, https://perma.cc/E4DD-E9LY (last visited
Mar. 2, 2019); ICORating, https://perma.cc/4NFX-XXUH (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); TrackICO,
https://perma.cc/YGH7-94AF (last visited Mar. 2, 2019). See Olga Kharif, Only One in 10 Tokens Is in Use
Following Initial Coin Offerings, Bloomberg (Oct. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZB9Y-ELCV.
2. Infra Sections I.F and II.D. For the first half of 2018 alone, estimates reached $12 billion. See
Benjamin Robertson, Crypto Bulls Pile Into ICOs at Record Pace Despite Bitcoin Rout, Bloomberg (Aug. 2,
2018), https://perma.cc/DK63-F37M.
3. Whereas total ICO volume was $26 million in 2014 and $14 million in 2015, it rose to $222
million in 2016 and reached $1266 million in the first six months of 2017. See #TOKEN MANIA,
Autonomous Next, https://perma.cc/8KT4-JP5R. Our data suggest that the total ICO volume in the
second half of 2017 by far exceeded the sum of all previous ICOs together; those numbers were by and
large matched by those of the period of January to July 2018. After August 2018 the capital raised by
ICOs was in decline, and so was the number of ICOs. See infra Section II.D.
4. See Camila Russo & Ilya Khrennikov, Big Investors Circle Telegram’s ICO While Veteran Crypto Insiders
Pass, Bloomberg (Feb. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y7KM-6D2G.
5. See Tamlin Magee, Biggest initial coin offerings, Techworld (Aug. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/
W4WL-FXXW. We have chosen to exclude the RedCab ICO from our analysis as we could not secure
reliable consistent data about it, and our information requests to its initiators went unanswered. For some
information on it, see TrackICO, RedCab (REDC), https://perma.cc/N7AA-K8T5 (last visited Mar. 2,
2019).
6. See infra Part I.
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privately ordered club markets, with 19th century London as the most fa-
miliar example—that this has persisted as the market has grown makes no
economic sense at all, except as an example of path dependence. The market
has now expanded globally through technologically underpinned network
effects—particularly through social media and other forms of Internet com-
munication—to a market where essentially no one knows anyone else—sim-
ilar to the evolutionary context of the U.S. securities markets as opposed to
the example of the club structure prevalent in the U.K. in the 19th century.
In addition, while early structures mostly sought to avoid legal and regu-
latory considerations, viewing these as addressed through the technology
involved as well as pre-existing relationships, as the market has expanded,
there has been an increasing involvement of major legal and advisory firms
in the area, including—in some cases—banks and other traditional financial
institutions involved in traditional capital raising and asset management.7
Prominent examples demonstrate very significant issues: some ICOs have
been unmasked as scams and Ponzi schemes,8 while others, including one of
7. On the legal perspective of ICOs, see Iris M. Barsan, Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings, 3
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier 54 (2017); Shaanan Cohney, David A. Hoffman, Jeremy
Sklaroff, David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 591 (2019); Usha Rodrigues,
Law and the Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 679 (2019); Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based
Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets (Cardozo Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 527, Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/4565-9RRT; Kevin Werbach, Trust But Verify:
Why Blockchain Needs Law, 32 Berkeley J.L. & Tech. 487 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Munchee Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10445 (SEC Dec. 11, 2017), https://per
ma.cc/ET52-T99G; Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), SEC Exposes Two
Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds (Sept. 29, 2017), https://perma
.cc/4GJW-QSWU (stating that the SEC “today charged a businessman and two companies with de-
frauding investors in a pair of so-called initial coin offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by investments
in real estate and diamonds. The SEC alleges that Maksim Zaslavskiy and his companies have been
selling unregistered securities, and the digital tokens or coins being peddled don’t really exist. According
to the SEC’s complaint, investors in REcoin Group Foundation and DRC World (also known as Dia-
mond Reserve Club) have been told they can expect sizeable returns from the companies’ operations when
neither has any real operations. Zaslavskiy allegedly touted REcoin as ‘The First Ever Cryptocurrency
Backed by Real Estate.’ Alleged misstatements to REcoin investors included that the company had a
‘team of lawyers, professionals, brokers, and accountants’ that would invest REcoin’s ICO proceeds into
real estate when in fact none had been hired or even consulted. Zaslavskiy and REcoin allegedly misrep-
resented they had raised between $2 million and $4 million from investors when the actual amount is
approximately $300,000”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Emergency Action Halts ICO Scam (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/SG8A-YXRY. Another example involves the Swiss regulator:
FINMA has closed down the unauthorised providers of the fake cryptocurrency ‘E-Coin’ . . . .
For over a year since 2016, the QUID PRO QUO Association had been issuing so-called ‘E-
Coins’, a fake cryptocurrency developed by the association itself. Working together with DIG-
ITAL TRADING AG and Marcelco Group AG, the association gave interested parties access
to an online platform on which E-Coins could be traded and transferred. Via this platform,
these three legal entities accepted funds amounting to at least four million Swiss francs from
several hundred users and operated virtual accounts for them in both legal tender and E-Coins.
This activity is similar to the deposit-taking business of a bank and is illegal unless the com-
pany in question holds the relevant financial market licence . . . .
Press Release, Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”), FINMA Closes Down Coin Prov-
iders and Issues Warning About Fake Cryptocurrencies (Sept. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/B8TD-TW7N. Cf.
Bitcoin Exchange Guide News Team, Biggest 2018 ICO Scams, Ponzi Schemes, Crypto Thefts & Hacks So Far,
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the larger to date,9 have brought governance concerns to the fore and caught
the attention of financial regulators. There has been a wide range of regula-
tory responses: from an outright ban or statement of disapproval of ICOs in
China10 and South Korea11 respectively, to warning notices by European,12
U.S.,13 and other regulators14—reinforced by statements that securities laws
Bitcoin Exchange Guide (Jul. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/UPY4-FT8M (stating that the founders of
the $32 million Centratech ICO were put behind bars for fraud which included fake personas and celeb-
rity endorsements, and that in the case of OneCoin, “the company advertised to investors, but there was
not any actual company to invest in”); Amelia Tomasicchio, Top 5 Cryptocurrency Scams, Bitcoin Chaser
(Jun. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/34G5-4CCM (listing five scams with a total damage of more than $50
million).
9. Regarding the Pincoin/Ifan ICO, it is reported that the founders “managed to fulfill their promises
of cash rewards and returns, so the investors continued to bring in their friends and publicize the work
that Pincoin was doing” while none of the information about the founders, and the team could be
confirmed and the team eventually took off with its fiat money. See Bitcoin Exchange Guide News Team,
supra note 8. Regarding the Tezos ICO (where $232 million was collected while the founders had ini- R
tially envisioned a gross intake of only $10 million), the Swiss news website Finews reports that the
founders of Tezos (a U.S.-based couple and U.S. enterprise Dynamic Ledger Solutions) employed a Swiss
foundation for launching its ICO in order to establish a new cryptocurrency “Tezzie.” According to that
report, the U.S. couple claims $20 million in commissions from the Swiss foundation. Further, key
people of the foundation are said to demand bonuses and commissions out of the Tezos ICO. At the same
time the news website reports that it is unclear a) whether Tezos investors will receive a return for their
payments, and b) where the funds collected in the ICO and denominated in BTC and ETH are safekept.
See Tezos-ICO: Streit um Millionen im “Cryptovalley,” Finews (Oct. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/L36Z-
VLM3. On the same ICO, another website reports violation of FINRA regulations regarding disclosure
rules on compensation of key staff as well as on business development, and that the Tezos project has
difficulties finding skilled staff. See Blockchain-Projekt Tezos: Gro¨bter ICO droht zu scheitern, Deutsche
Wirtschafts Nachrichten (Oct. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/WX8S-EKF4. Parts of the news were
also reported on the websites of Fortune and CoinDesk. As of November 15 2017, two class actions were
filed against the Tezos founders, the Tezos Foundation and Dynamic Ledger Solutions—the Delaware-
based company that holds Tezos’ intellectual property—alleging that the founders deceptively sold unre-
gistered securities in violation of both federal and state law when they raised $232 million in an initial
coin offering (ICO) in July. See Aaron Stanley, Tezos Founders Hit With Second Class Action Suit, CoinDesk
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/UTT6-V6K3. In at least one version of the Tezos whitepaper, pay-
ments were explicitly made as “donations” to the Tezos Foundation.
10. See Lulu Yilun Chen & Justina Lee, Bitcoin Tumbles as PBOC Declares Initial Coin Offerings Illegal,
Bloomberg (Sept. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/2A8J-JL69. For further details, see infra Section IV.A.
11. See Yuji Nakamura & Sam Kim, Cryptocurrencies Drop as South Korea Bans ICOs, Margin Trading
Bloomberg (Sept. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/V5XB-HYXR.
12. See Press Release, European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), ESMA Highlights ICO
Risks for Investors and Firms (Nov. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/CYH7-XXQS (stating that “ESMA is
concerned that firms involved in ICOs may conduct their activities without complying with relevant
applicable EU legislation.”). The national regulators coordinated by ESMA issued similar warning no-
tices. See e.g., AFM waarschuwt voor grote risico’s bij Initial Coin Offerings, AFM (NL) (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/JE4R-ZWXW; Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (“BaFin”), Consumer Warn-
ing: The Risks of Initial Coin Offerings (Nov. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/JM49-XZEN; Financial Con-
duct Authority (“FCA”), Consumer Warning About the Risks of Initial Coin Offerings (Sept., 12,
2017), https://perma.cc/Y69C-SLLB. See Press Release, FINMA, supra note 8. R
13. See Public Statement, SEC, SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs (Nov.
1, 2017), https://perma.cc/2Q69-KJ73 (demanding compliance with U.S. disclosure rules).
14. See Media Release, Monetary Authority of Singapore, MAS Clarifies Regulatory Position on the
Offer of Digital Tokens in Singapore (Aug. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/W9KS-BLX6; Press Release, SEC,
Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings (Jul. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/7G6M-PUT4; SEC Thailand’s
Viewpoint on ICO, Securities and Exchange Commission Thailand (Sept. 14, 2017), https://perma
.cc/T77N-6HES.
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are potentially applicable and registration is necessary15—to more support-
ive approaches in other jurisdictions,16 with Switzerland,17 and to a lesser
extent Singapore,18 leading the way, having recognized the applicability of
securities regulations to utility and asset tokens.
This article draws on a rapidly growing, hand-assembled database of doc-
umentation for over 1000 ICOs, hereinafter called the Whitepaper Database
since the documents made available during the launch of an ICO are usually
called “whitepapers.”19 These whitepapers were gathered from thirty web-
sites functioning as ICO repositories.20 While we do analyze characteristics
15. This message was conveyed by Canadian securities regulators on August 24, 2017. See CSA Staff
Notice 46-307: Cryptocurrency Offerings, Ontario Securities Commission (Aug. 24, 2017), https://
perma.cc/4TY3-RRP5.
16. For instance, French regulator AMF announced a two-pronged approach consisting of a new regu-
latory position on ICOs on which the AMF consulted with market participants from October to Decem-
ber 2017, on the one hand, and a new program dubbed “UNICORN,” on the other hand, which is
“aimed at providing a mechanism for ICO organizers in France to carry out their plans under the
agency’s guidance.” Press Release, Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, L’AMF lance une consultation sur les
Initial Coin Offerings et initie son programme UNICORN (Oct. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/G75E-
88JT. In turn, the AMF launched a comprehensive set of ICO rules in September 2018, in order to
attract innovators globally. See Ana Berman, France Finalizes New ICO Framework to “Attract Innovators
Globally”, Cointelegraph (Sept. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/AG6C-BUJ2.
17. The Swiss government is seeking to foster Fintech innovation in relation to blockchain technol-
ogy, in particular, while preserving Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Know Your Customer
(“KYC”) requirements. The Swiss government is exploring the creation of a new regulated entity called a
“crypto-bank.” Moreover, digital currencies are not considered securities (and thus subject to Swiss se-
curities regulation) but assets. Nevertheless, FINMA has clarified that AML and Counter-Terrorist Fi-
nancing (“CTF”), banking, and securities trading, as well as collective investment rules, could apply. See
FINMA Guidance 04/2017: Regulatory Treatment of Initial Coin Offerings, FINMA (Sept. 29, 2017), https://
perma.cc/VB7B-L259. In February 2018, FINMA published a regulatory guidance on ICOs, with a focus
on the application of money laundering legislation. FINMA, Wegleitung fu¨r Unterstellungsanfragen
betreffend Initial Coin Offerings (Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/6XT6-K9HW.
18. Singapore’s regulator MAS does not consider digital currencies as regulated funding sources or
payment instruments, but as assets; in turn, while the MAS regulates KYC and AML requirements it
does not regulate virtual currency intermediaries nor the proper functioning of virtual currency transac-
tions. At the same time, on August 1, 2017, MAS clarified that:
[I]f a token is structured in the form of a security, the ICO must comply with existing securi-
ties laws aimed at safeguarding investors’ interest. So the requirements of having to register a
prospectus, obtain intermediary or exchange operator licences, will apply. These intermediaries
must also comply with existing rules on anti-money laundering and countering terrorism fi-
nancing . . . . MAS does not and cannot regulate all products that people put their money in
thinking that they will appreciate in value. But recognising that the risks of investing in
virtual currencies are significant, MAS and the Commercial Affairs Department have published
an advisory alerting consumers to these risks, and are working together to raise public aware-
ness of potential scams.
Saktiandi Supaat, Reply to Parliamentary Question on the Prevalence Use of Cryptocurrency in Singapore and
Measures to Regulate Cryptocurrency and Initial Coin Offerings: Notice Paper 869 of 2017, MAS (for Parliament
Sitting on Oct. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/W9KS-BLX6. For more on ICOs in Asia, see D.W. Arner,
R.P. Buckley, D.A. Zetzsche, B. Zhao, A. Didenko, C-Y. Park and E. Pashoska, Cryptocurrencies,
Blockchain and ICOs: Policy and Regulatory Challenges of Distributed Ledger Technology and Digital Assets in
Asia, in Cryptoassets: Legal Regulatory and Monetary Perspectives (Chris Brummer ed.,
forthcoming 2019).
19. See infra Section I.E.
20. Websites from which ICO documentation has been drawn include, among others, CoinDesk
(https://perma.cc/D445-ZBUV), CoinFi (https://perma.cc/C8YA-5C6T), CoinGecko (https://perma.cc/
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of the ICOs in the Whitepaper Database throughout this Article, the pro-
portions we give should not be taken as being anything more than broadly
indicative, as the total universe of ICOs now numbers over 5000. Our sam-
ple, however, comprises one of the largest datasets considered to date, partic-
ularly of whitepapers. Our latest results are therefore significant as they are
based on about 20% of the total ICOs issued to date. To our knowledge, this
database, and in particular its focus on legal disclosures, is unique it pro-
vides a much-needed insight into disclosure quality in the context of ICOs
and underpins our analysis of policy considerations below.
To further verify the core messages from our analysis of our Whitepaper
Database, our analysis is supplemented by three webscraped datasets taken
from websites TrackICO (trackico.io), ICORating (icorating.com) and
ICObench (icobench.com), comprising data on 4170, 5223, and 5320 ICOs
respectively as of February 15, 2019. The data disclosed on those three web-
sites focus, for the most part, on rough ICO metrics such as country of
origin and capital raised. For this reason, we treat these webscraped
databases as supplementary to the Whitepaper Database in our analysis.
From this dataset, in Part II we describe how ICOs are set up, provide a
basic taxonomy of ICOs, and analyze which legal frameworks might apply to
which types of ICOs. In Parts III and IV we highlight some key risks for the
financial system and for ICO participants. In Part V we consider possible
responses of regulators and supervisors. Part VI concludes.
I. A Taxonomy of Initial Coin Offerings
A. Common Characteristics
ICOs take so many different forms that the task of definition is no simple
matter. However, the structure, following its name, is based on the offer of
DD8J-QZM8), CoinMarketCap (https://perma.cc/CBY4-PUHU), CoinRating (https://perma.cc/
89VF-66BV), CoinSchedule (https://perma.cc/65FM-JNW9), CryptoPotato (https://perma.cc/
M9SV-Y633), CryptoSlate (https://perma.cc/62KH-Y4F5), EtherScan (https://perma.cc/FJC8-
YH9A), ICO Alert (https://perma.cc/BCG3-VSSQ), ICObench (https://perma.cc/E4DD-E9LY), ICO
Countdown (https://perma.cc/2374-3J97), ICO daily (https://perma.cc/B8VM-UMFY), ICO Drops
(https://perma.cc/NLB2-HB3D), ICO Hot List (https://perma.cc/W945-BCMJ), ICOindex (https://per
ma.cc/JE3H-TAAU), ICO-List (https://perma.cc/N342-QVPE), ICO-Map (https://perma.cc/TXS8-
R4HA), ICO Panic (https://perma.cc/Y4CX-LZ6C), ICOQuest (https://perma.cc/C5P8-SAHQ),
ICORating (https://perma.cc/4CYZ-N6JT), ICO Report (https://perma.cc/5VFM-635A), ICOstats
(https://perma.cc/9CHA-SUW2), ICO Tracker (https://perma.cc/UV98-U2AB), Smith + Crown
(https://perma.cc/X2S6-V5EJ), TokenData (https://perma.cc/95ZE-MMQT), TokenMarket (https://
perma.cc/D8N8-MWAM), Top ICO List (https://perma.cc/XD9T-96PP), TrackICO (https://perma.cc/
CZ48-7NGP), and WorldCoinIndex (https://perma.cc/PQ47-52WW). Note that our database is far
from complete and is unlikely to ever be complete, given the quantity of ICOs currently taking place.
Methodologies used by listing websites vary widely. For example, in the case of XRP, the total supply is
inflated since only roughly 40% of XRP is in public circulation. The database merely functions as
evidence of the variety of ICOs and of the legal concerns we seek to address herein.
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digital tokens or coins utilizing blockchain technology.21 As with the tokens
that represent cryptocurrencies,22 such as Bitcoin23 and Ether,24 in an ICO
the initiators establish a blockchain and grant tokens (also known as
21. For examples of the legal and governance aspects of Blockchain from the regulator’s perspective,
see ESMA, Report: The Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets (Feb.
7, 2017); IOSCO, Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech) ch. 5 (Feb. 2017),
https://perma.cc/J86S-BCBK; Op-ed: Blockchain, ASIC (Oct. 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/H6TR-THNY.
From the academic perspective, see Lewis Rinaudo Cohen & David Contreiras Tyler, Blockchain’s Three
Capital Markets Innovations Explained, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (2016); Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in
Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 Duke L.J. 569 (2015–2016); Wessel Reijers et al., Governance in
Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 Ledger 134 (2016); Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond
Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 Vill. L.
Rev. 191 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?,
69 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 232 (2016). From the French literature, see Primavera De Filippi &
Michel Reymond, La Blockchain: comment re´guler sans autorite´, Nume´rique: reprendre le controˆle 83
(Tristan Nitot (dir.) & Nina Cercy eds. 2016); Pierre-Marie Lore, blockchain: e´volution ou re´volution
pour les contrats en France? (2016) (M.B.A. thesis, Institute Le´onard de Vinci), https://perma.cc/7C8E-
AXMX (analyzing vulnerabilities from a contractual perspective).
22. For more on this topic, see Edward D. Baker, Trustless Property Systems and Anarchy: How Trustless
Transfer Technology Will Shape the Future of Property Exchange, 45 Sw. L. Rev. 351 (2015–2016); V. Gerard
Comizio, Virtual Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in the Emerging FinTech Ecosystem,
21 N.C. Banking Inst. 131 (2017); Matthew P. Ponsford, A Comparative Analysis of Bitcoin and Other
Decentralised Virtual Currencies: Legal Regulation in the People’s Republic of China, Canada, and the United
States, 9 Hong Kong J.L. Stud. 29 (2015). From Spain, see Ma Nieves Pacheco Jime´nez, Criptodivisas:
Del Bitcoin Al Mufg. El Potencial De La Technologı´a Blockchain, 19 Revista Cesco De Derecho De
Consumo 6 (2016).
23. Compare Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforce-
ment in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 Nev. L.J. 139, 140–55 (2016); Primavera De Filippi,
Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, 3 Internet Pol’y Rev. 1, 10 (2014); Joshua J.
Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System,
73 La. L. Rev. 1119 (2012–2013); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4
Hastings Sci. & L.J. 159, 171 (2012); Nikolei M. Kaplanov, NerdyMoney: Bitcoin, the Private Digital
Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 111 (2012–2013); Nicholas A.
Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF, 14 Chi. J. Int’l. L.
377 (2013); Misha Tsukerman, The Block Is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and Suggestions
fort he Future, 30 Berkeley Tech L.J. 1127 (2015); Peter Twomey, Halting a Shift in the Paradigm: The
Need for Bitcoin Regulation, 16 Trinity C.L. Rev. 67 (2013); John O. McGinnis & Kyle W. Roche,
Bitcoin: Order without Law in the Digital Age (Mar. 7, 2017) (Unpublished L. Res. Paper); Edward V.
Murphy, M. Maureen Murphy & Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin: Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal
Issues, Cong. Res. Serv. (Oct. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/VV46-9TZB. From Germany, see Benjamin
Beck & Dominik Ko¨nig, Bitcoins als Gegenstand von sekunda¨ren Leistungspflichten, 215 Archiv fu¨r die
Civilitische Praxis 655 (2015); Franziska Boehm & Paulina Pesch, Bitcoins: Rechtliche Herausforderungen
einer virtuellen Wa¨hrung – Eine erste juristische Einordnung, MMR 75 (2014); Daniel Kerscher, Bitcoin
– Funktionsweise, Chancen und Risiken der digitalen Wa¨hrung 120 (2013); Nico Kuhlmann,
Bitcoins – Funktionsweise und rechtliche Einordnung der digitalen Wa¨hrung, Computer & Recht 691 (2014);
Gerald Spindler & Martin Bille, Rechtsprobleme von Bitcoins als virtuelle Wa¨hrung, Wertpapiermit-
teilungen 1357 (2014).
24. Ether is the cryptocurrency used in the context of Ethereum, one of the most widely used
blockchain systems. Ether has also become infamous as currency used for funding the Decentralized
Autonomous Organization (“DAO”). See Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal
Education in the Blockchain Revolution (Mar. 22, 2017) (unpublished Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 17-
05, U. St. Thomas) 31 et seq; Charlie Shier et al., Understanding a Revolutionary and Flawed Grand Experi-
ment in Blockchain: The DAO Attack (Aug. 7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/VB55-
A8RA.
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“coins”) to its participants.25 To date, most ICOs have been Internet-based
and open to the public, though with varying levels of selection in terms of
potential participants and their amounts of investment.
The idea and/or inchoate technology in an ICO can come from any indus-
try or service sector. Figure 1 shows the economic sectors for ICO
whitepapers in the Whitepaper Database.
Figure 1: ICOs by Industry (Whitepaper Database)26
In most cases the ICO occurs early in the business or project.27 However,
while the “initial” in ICO implies a first offer of tokens or coins, the offer is
often the second or third offer of the tokens for subscription, and merely the
first to the public. Some 52.11% of the tokens in our Whitepaper Database
reveal they have been offered in a presale to a private investor group prior to
the ICO (4.70% did not provide any information on the matter, 43.18%
stated that the offering was in fact initial). The actual number of pre-offer-
ings will be higher given the poor quality and content of documentation and
the current absence of standards and enforcement.28 The results of our
Whitepaper Database are confirmed by our webscraped information which
show presale arrangements in about 50.79% (TrackICO), 44.47% (ICORat-
ing), and 36.17% (ICObench) of cases. The large number of presales without
adequate disclosure or safeguards such as lock-up periods gives rise to con-
25. We are not using formal financial terms such as promoters, investors and the like, as the legal
status of ICOs remains problematic and undecided.
26. The categories used here are based on categorizations provided by the ICO websites.
27. Stellar Development Foundation & Luxembourg House of Financial Technology, Understanding
Initial Coin Offerings: Technology, Benefits, Risks, and Regulations, Stellar 23 (Sept. 2017), https://perma
.cc/4B98-JZEN.
28. Lex Sokolin, Global Director of Fintech Strategy at Autonomous NEXT, estimates that 80% of
ICOs are doing presales. Cf. Olga Kharif, Hedge Funds Flip ICOs, Leaving Other Investors Holding the Bag,
Bloomberg (Oct. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/98DM-VRHC.
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cerns since it facilitates ‘pump-and-dump schemes’ in offerings, leading to a
range of consumer protection and other risks, which may or may not fall
within the scope of existing law.29
This impression is further supported by ICO distribution strategies in
which celebrities have been involved. High-profile examples include Paris
Hilton (LydianCoin), “Ghostface Killah” from the Wu Tang Clan (Cream
Capital), Jamie Foxx (Cobinhood) and Floyd Mayweather Jr. (Stox).30 The
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has warned in-
vestors of celebrity advertisement as it may be part of paid promotions and
does not replace conducting research on the intended investment.31
B. Token or Coin Characteristics
The tokens often called “coins,” typically exhibit the characteristics of a
digital voucher and grant the participants a right of some kind, which can
take a range of forms and functions. The particular right represented by a
token varies. A token may represent a license to use a software program
(usage token), a membership in a community (community token) or an enti-
tlement to a financial asset. There are two broad categories of financial to-
kens: currency tokens and equity tokens. Currency tokens are characterized
by a token reflecting a right in another currency, whether crypto or other-
wise.32 Equity tokens represent the right to a share in a cash flow generated
by some underlying asset.33 Among the equity tokens, some ICOs confer
participation of token holders in an asset pool in a non-segregated manner,
while in other cases the token allows participation in one single asset, sepa-
rable from other assets. Figure 2 shows our taxonomy based on what the
token represents.
29. These risks are considered in detail in Part II, infra.
30. See Ryan Browne, Wu-Tang Clan’s Ghostface Killah Co-founded a Cryptocurrency Venture – Now It
Wants to Raise $30 Million, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/AQ4E-JW8N; Eugene Kim,
Cryptocurrency Investors Worry about a Bubble as Jamie Foxx and Other Celebrities Jump on Board, CNBC (Sept.
19, 2017), https://perma.cc/9P33-8CC5; Rob Price, Paris Hilton Is the Latest Celeb to Back an ICO, the
Hottest Craze in Tech Fundraising, Business Insider (Sept. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/5PYB-RZ5K.
31. See Press Release, SEC, Statement on Potentially Unlawful Promotion of Initial Coin Offerings
and Other Investments by Celebrities and Others (Nov. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/FNL9-3XSA.
32. For example, one token represents one newly offered cryptocurrency SANDCOIN.
33. The payment and equity characteristics can take several forms, for instance the token value can be
modified by an additional component, similar to a derivative; for instance, the pay out or delivery of the
reference value can be deferred like in a forward contract or conditioned on certain circumstances, for
instance, that a certain reference index moves up or down, similar to derivatives.
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Figure 2: ICO Taxonomy by Token Reference
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Effectively, ICOs to date have paralleled the universe of crowdfunding
techniques, from donation or charity-based structures to rewards to equity
and debt,34 but with the token providing the evidence or rights granted in
the process.
Figure 2 introduces, besides consideration,35 the distinction between cur-
rency, equity, and utility tokens. Currency tokens are characterized by the
fact that one token is meant to take the form of a new cryptocurrency or to
reflect a right in another currency, either crypto or otherwise. For instance, 1
token could reflect the value of $1, C=1 or 1 ETH. The ICO merely translates
a currency into bits and bytes if it is not already in that form, and if it is
already digital, as in the case of a cryptocurrency, the ICO merely provides a
different wrapper for it. An equity token represents the right to a share in a
cash-flow other than a currency that is to be generated by an underlying
business or investment; and in some cases the whitepaper “grants” voting
rights or other means to influence the project development in the future.
Finally, a utility token provides any type of utility not fitting in the two
former categories.
While ICOs are often characterized as “utility” or “currency” tokens by
their promoters, the reality of the particular transaction must be looked at
carefully to deduce their nature, with tokens ranging from funding of early
stage research (similar to charitable crowdfunding via GoFundMe and the
like), to pre-purchase of specific products, often blockchain based (similar to
34. On crowdfunding methodology, see Opinion: Investment Based Crowdfunding, ESMA 6 (Dec. 18,
2014), https://perma.cc/3PHJ-MCH4; Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, European Com-
mission 8 (2016), https://perma.cc/7F35-6UN6; IOSCO, Research Report on Financial Technol-
ogies, supra note 21. R
35. For details, see infra Section I.D.
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rewards crowdfunding via Kickstarter), to investment structures of various
forms (similar to equity or debt crowdfunding).
Figure 3: ICOs by Reference Value (ICORating & ICObench
Database v. Whitepaper Database)36
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of ICOs from different sources. The data
from the ICORating and ICObench Databases show a large number of ICOs
(66% and 96% respectively) being self-categorized as utility tokens. These
figures have to be interpreted in light of the considerable regulatory advan-
tages, to an issuer, of characterizing their offering as a utility token.
In contrast, the Whitepaper Database reflects a random sample of hand-
collected ICOs of which we have determined the classification. There is sig-
nificant divergence between the webscraped and the hand-selected data.
This classification resulted in 45% of tokens being utility tokens, while
currency tokens (34%) and equity tokens (13%) played a significantly more
important role than in the webscraped data. While there may be some tech-
nical reasons for that divergence,37 we note that reward-based strucures,
36. Data from ICORating and ICObench databases reflect distribution of ICOs self-categorized as
utility tokens. See ICObench, https://perma.cc/E4DD-E9LY; ICORating, https://perma.cc/4CYZ-
N6JT. By comparison, data from the WhitePaper Database reflect a sample of ICOs whose classification
has been determined by the authors and thus hopefully free from the bias towards classification as a usage
token inherent in self-categorization See supra note 20. R
37. Among them are the following: (1) The Whitepaper Database has only 1042 ICOs while both the
ICORating and the ICObench website have more than 5000 ICOs. We cannot exclude that all of the
remaining ICOs not considered in our Whitepaper Database are utility tokens, although we doubt it. (2)
For lack of a commonly accepted terminology the disclosures could rest on different characteristics for
each token type. (3) The websites could have applied default settings indicating utility tokens. Even if
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which would include ICOs that are functionally utility tokens as opposed to
simply self-defined as such, raise by far the least concern from a financial
regulation perspective,38 and therefore the promoters have a strong incentive
to self-classify their tokens as utility tokens regardless of the functional real-
ity. There is also a dramatic variation in currency tokens, from those that
create essentially improved versions of Bitcoin to those that underlie entire
ecosystems, such as the original Ethereum proposal with Ether at its heart.
C. Issuing Entities and Backers
In addition to a website and often a YouTube video, ICOs typically in-
volve documentation called a “whitepaper.” A “whitepaper” is defined on
Wikipedia as:
an authoritative report or guide that informs readers concisely
about a complex issue and presents the issuing body’s philosophy
on the matter. It is meant to help readers understand an issue,
solve a problem, or make a decision.39
The U.K. and Australian governments, as well as the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (“HKMA”) and many other governments and government related
organizations often issue whitepapers on issues, and the Wikipedia defini-
tion captures the purpose of such documents very well. The whitepapers that
typically accompany an ICO are different beasts altogether, and usually bear
no relation at all to the sort of prospectuses that typically accompany an
offering of securities. Rather, ICO whitepapers tend to be a simple descrip-
tion of the project and the structure in which tokens will be used to support
it. The origins of ICO whitepapers can be traced back to the 2009
whitepaper for Bitcoin published under the name of Satoshi Nakamoto,40 in
which the technical features of Bitcoin were outlined but almost nothing
else.
Whitepapers for ICOs typically reveal very little about the issuing enti-
ties and their backers. These whitepapers often fail to give a physical, postal,
or other contact address. In 21.69% of the whitepapers in the Whitepaper
Database, the ICO documentation failed to convey any information at all
about the issuing entity. Only 32.82% of the whitepapers mentioned the
issuing entity, the country of origin, and provided an address. That means,
in total, of all ICOs in the Whitepaper Database, more than 67% of issuers
did not disclose usable contact details, leading to obvious consequences for
they all self-define as utility tokens, that would in any event not answer the questions around the true
functional nature of each ICO.
38. See infra Section IV.C.
39. White Paper, Wikipedia, https://perma.cc/G8N9-7568 (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
40. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Bitcoin, https://perma.cc/5MMT-
4H7W.
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consumers seeking either further information or redress.41 Moreover, in 31%
of the cases the whitepapers do not provide any information at all about the
initiators or backers.
D. Consideration
While the ICOs in our database have only been issued in return for con-
sideration, consideration is not a prerequisite for ICOs. Token issuances can
be for the sole purpose of gathering a group of participants interested in
blockchain technology for later use, for instance for social media or market-
ing purposes. Given we are particularly interested in the financial law
dimensions of ICOs, however, we focus in this article on ICOs for considera-
tion. Importantly, a number of ICOs define the contribution being sought
in terms of “donation,” as true donations of funds to an ICO would raise
even fewer potential legal and regulatory concerns than true rewards-based
structures. Once again, this suggests the need for a careful functional analy-
sis in each case.
The consideration can be any type of valuable asset. For the purpose of our
analysis, we take consideration to include cases in which the whitepaper
defines the payment as a donation, if the functional nature of the ICO is in
fact not charitable in nature. This approach ensures each ICO considered is
categorized according to its function in reality, and not necessarily according
to the terms of its whitepaper. In many cases, ICOs are issued for cryptocur-
rency, for instance, consideration paid in Ether. While this suggests tech
savviness and seems to appeal to the expected participant constituency, the
value of consideration in this case depends on the market value of the
cryptocurrencies which often fluctuate significantly on a daily basis. We
have also seen a number of ICOs where the consideration is to be paid in
cash, typically U.S. Dollars. The total issue amount available for subscrip-
tion in currency value (hereafter “ICO funding target”) has varied from the
equivalent of a few thousand U.S. Dollars42 to well over 1 billion U.S.
Dollars.43
As indicative of the size of ICOs, we use the maximum amount an-
nounced as the targeted fund raising (“hard cap”).
41. Consumer protection issues and the risks associated with information asymmetry are considered in
detail in Part IV., infra.
42. See, e.g., the Pally ICO from 2017, collecting $33,508 according to TrackICO.io, for the creation
of a decentralized social travel ecosystem that ‘enables travellers to create friendships and access authentic
experiences in new cities through local people - using direct peer-to-peer payment’ (see https://perma.cc/
7W9C-3N67); and the Crypto Improvement Fund ICO from 2017/18, collecting $35,750, where tokens
represent access to an educational platform and blockchain-related services provider that could be used as
#an all-in-one functionality as a business incentive, marketing tool and customer loyalty program.’ (see
https://perma.cc/36Q2-VK4K).
43. For example, see the ICOs by EOS (Cayman Islands), https://perma.cc/B2EU-4QQA, and Telegram
(British Virgin Island), https://perma.cc/9RML-TBMM.
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Figure 4: Distribution of ICOs by Funding Target in U.S.
Dollars Set by ICO Issuer (Whitepaper Database)44
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Figure 4 shows the distribution of ICO hard caps in the Whitepaper
Database. Seventy percent of the ICOs where the hard cap was disclosed in
the whitepaper aimed to collect between $10–100 million. A sizable pro-
portion, at 20%, sought between $1–10 million, with ICOs seeking either
very small or very large amounts being relatively uncommon. While actual
subscriptions may be much lower,45 our data show that ICOs aimed to col-
lect serious money, and did so frequently and successfully.
The most astonishing number, however, is that only 41% of the
whitepapers in our Whitepaper Database state a hard cap (i.e., a maximum
amount the promoters are willing to collect). An additional 4%, while being
silent on a hard cap, at least provided a soft cap (i.e., a minimal amount
required for the project).46 In turn, 55% of the whitepapers remain silent on
either the minimum or maximum amount of money they are seeking. While
that number seems to be on the low end when compared to our other three
databases that consider website disclosures in addition to whitepaper disclo-
sures,47 it is safe to assume that a significant portion of whitepapers do not
provide any information on the amount the ICO promoters seek to gather
from ICO participants.48
E. A Proper ICO Structure
In a well-developed ICO structure—and as we highlighted above, many,
if not most, to date have not been well-developed, nor actively utilize legal
and/or consulting advice—a team of technology entrepreneurs transfers, by
44. See supra note 20. R
45. See infra Section II.D.
46. Overall, 24% of the whitepapers considered provided a soft cap.
47. Of the ICOs listed, ICObench reports soft caps in 53% and hard caps in 73%, ICORating in
38% and 46%, and TrackICO in 37% and 45%. See ICObench, https://perma.cc/E4DD-E9LY;
ICORating, https://perma.cc/4CYZ-N6JT; and TrackICO, https://perma.cc/CZ48-7NGP.
48. On policy conclusions, see infra Section II.A.
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way of sale or licensing, an idea into an ICO vehicle. The vehicle is most
often a limited company, although in Anglo-American countries it can be a
trust and in civil law countries a foundation. One could call this a “proper”
ICO structure, designed in a formal manner to comply with major legal
requirements. From a legal perspective, the ICO vehicle makes certain
promises the terms of which vary from ICO to ICO. The promises can, for
instance, range from an exclusive right to use a certain IT service under
development, to the right to participate in a community or to vote upon the
future development of the software design underlying the token, or to par-
ticipate in the future cash-flow generated by the ICO vehicle. The terms of
the promises state that holders of “tokens”49 will be able to request from the
ICO vehicle fulfillment of the promise, i.e. the token holders enter into a
legal relationship of some type with the ICO vehicle.50
In such a structure, a number of service providers will typically be in-
volved. These service providers, for instance, may (1) establish the ICO vehi-
cle based on legal and tax considerations, (2) prepare the documents, (3)
sometimes function as the vehicle’s directors or trustees respectively, and (4)
support the token issuance by promoting the ICO on the important ICO
websites, stimulating discussion in the ICO community, and at times dis-
tributing tokens through digital advertising means.
Figure 5: “Proper” ICO Structure
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Entrepreneurs
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promoter contract
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F. Interaction with Venture Capital
While the traditional financial sector has been reluctant to invest in
ICOs, we see some alternative investment funds focusing on ICOs to provide
to a wider range of investors exposure to the high levels of profits which
49. For details, see Section I.B.
50. The nature of this promise varies and is subject to discussion, see infra Sections I.B–I.D.
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have been available. However, the role venture capitalists are to play in this
area is still unclear. Traditionally, venture capitalists offer investors access to
shares in new companies which are not yet being publicly traded. ICOs have
the potential to be more accessible to the public in their somewhat more
democratic nature, and entrepreneurial companies are moving towards rais-
ing funds using them.51
While the ICO environment is new and many investors and venture capi-
tal firms remain skeptical, there are indications that mimicking some as-
pects of the traditional venture deal structure is possible with ICOs. Matt
Huang of U.S. venture capital firm Sequoia Capital, for example, has told
Bloomberg the firm prefers tokens to be distributed over time, as with eq-
uity deal vesting periods. In his words, “[j]ust because it’s novel doesn’t
mean we have to reinvent everything from scratch.”52 Even if ICOs are not
able to replicate all services offered by venture capital firms, for example
advice and other assistance,53 they have the potential to replace at least the
existing early stage funding mechanisms for startups. Some analysts have
already suggested that funding raised by startups through ICOs has sur-
passed early stage venture capital funding.54
Furthermore, venture capitalists are becoming increasingly active at the
pre-ICO stage as well as in ICOs. Investors can now become involved by
buying rights to acquire tokens through newly developed contractual agree-
ments, for example Simple Agreements for Future Tokens (“SAFTs”), or by
entering into equity deals “guaranteeing investors . . . tokens if the startup
ever decides to hold an ICO in the future.”55 This is a role quite different
from simply purchasing a stake in a startup, and potentially waiting a num-
ber of years for a return.
In 2017, startups raised over $3.6 billion through ICOs,56 while $52.6
billion was raised overall from venture capitalists.57 This gap is likely decep-
tively large. At this early stage, figures in isolation carry little meaning, and
what matters more is the rate at which these numbers are increasing.58 Simi-
51. See Danny Crichton, Do Good Companies ICO?, TechCrunch (Dec. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/
LAB9-MLWX.
52. Joshua Brustein, Bitcoin Is Challenging the Entire Concept of Venture Capital, Bloomberg (Dec. 18,
2017), https://perma.cc/RD8C-CJSF.
53. See Martin Arnold, Venture Capital Investors Urged to Wake Up to ICOs, Financial Times (Oct. 2,
2017), https://perma.cc/LCS9-LHQ3.
54. In relation to Internet companies see Arjun Kharpal, Initial Coin Offerings Have Raised $1.2 Billion
and Now Surpass Early Stage VC Funding, CNBC (Aug. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/9C9T-PDX9.
55. Brustein, Bitcoin Is Challenging the Entire Concept of Venture Capital, supra note 52. R
56. See Cryptocurrency ICO States 2017, CoinSchedule, https://perma.cc/B32K-UJXW (last visited
Dec. 21, 2017).
57. PricewaterhouseCoopers & CB Insights, Venture Capital Funding Report Q3 2017
(2017).
58. See Funderbeam, Initial Coin Offerings Funding Report (2017), https://perma.cc/6KT3-
RKEL (for the various graphs and statistics compiled by Funderbeam in relation to total ICO funding,
total rounds, and round sizes over time). For example, between 2016 and 2017, total funding through
ICOs rose from $228 million to $2.6 billion.
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larly, it has been reported that 110 crypto hedge funds have been active in
the ICO/cryptocurrency markets since 2011, with 84 of them established in
2017, managing assets of $2.2 billion; the first crypto fund-of-funds was
established in October 2017.59 While the involvement of professional inves-
tors could promote market maturity, it also strengthens the link to the es-
tablished banking sector and thus enhances systemic risk.
G. Legal Information and Applicable Law
Given that ICOs are not subject to specific regulatory requirements in
most jurisdictions and are frequently structured to avoid existing legal and
regulatory requirements, or ICO issuers simply ignore such issues, the con-
tent of whitepapers is often inconsistent. The only consistent factor tends to
be a technical description of the underlying technology for which funding is
sought, as well as some description of the potential uses and benefits of said
technology.
In cases where legal and regulatory aspects have not simply just been
ignored—which as our data suggest, constitutes a sizable portion60—the
majority of larger ICOs to date have relied on legislative loopholes or, more
accurately, what the issuing entity hopes, or prays, is a loophole or grey area.
Only 35% of the ICOs in the Whitepaper Database mention the law appli-
cable to the ICO. In 21% of the cases the whitepaper excluded investors
from certain countries from participation.61 In 81% of the cases there is no
information at all as to the regulatory classification of the ICO.
This cavalier disregard of the need to inform a participant as to where
precisely their funds are going, and what rights are being given in return for
these funds, only makes sense when one appreciates the particular mindset of
many issuers of ICOs: a mindset facilitated by (optimistically) the innocence
of the stereotypical crypto-geek about legal or other requirements or (less
optimistically) the greed of participants who are literally prepared to give
money to entities on the basis of such extraordinarily scant information
purely in the hope of massive, short-term speculative gains. This mindset is
perhaps best described as anarcho-capitalism. It is the idea that the world
would work really well without government or regulation. As financial con-
tributions to an ICO can be made in cryptocurrency and benefits returned to
59. See Jemima Kelly & Maiy Keidan, Bitcoin ‘Boom’ Failing to Attract Big Name Investors, Indepen-
dent (Oct. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/GC5J-MEWN (citing data from technology research house au-
tonomous.next). Cf. Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: Operational
Issues and Best Practices for Institutional Cryptocurrency Trading, 23 Stanford J.L. Bus. & Fin. 112 (2018)
(providing a useful overview on crypto hedge funds).
60. Of the 19% of the whitepapers considered in our Whitepaper Database that provided some details
on regulatory context, the disclosures range from AML/KYC over data protection requirements to securi-
ties qualification of token, a mere statement of compliance with existing financial laws, or sharia compli-
ance, respectively, to gambling or betting regulations.
61. Our webscraped databases provide on restricted countries in 19.1% (ICORating), 31.81% (Track-
ICO) and 34.1% (ICObench) of the cases, respectively.
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participants in the same or other digital ways, many issuers of ICOs seem to
believe that these instruments exist beyond the jurisdiction of national laws
and courts.62 We do not accept this belief—courts are loath to cede jurisdic-
tion—and we have analyzed and dismissed it in the context of blockchain
and other distributed ledger systems in previous work.63 Yet whether this
belief is genuinely held or merely opportunistic, what matters is that issuers
are acting upon it, and participants are going along for the ride, at least
until major losses are incurred.
H. Geographical Breakdown
ICOs are a worldwide phenomenon. Drawing on references in ICObench,
the database with most regional data to date, Figure 6 shows the regional
distribution of ICOs across major markets. Given that we assume that the
ICOs or their service providers have contacted the website prior to listing, it
is surprising to see that in over 5% of cases the origin of the ICO was
unspecified. We would expect that the issuer’s country of origin is for any
investor a crucial fact.
Figure 6: ICO Vehicles’ Country of Origin
(ICObench Database, in %)64
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62. See e.g., Lana Swartz, What Was Bitcoin, What Will It Be? The Techno-economic Imaginaries of a New
Money Technology, 32 Cultural Studies 623 (2018); Alex Lielacher, Blockchain and the Utopia of a
Anarcho-capitalist Society, Crypto News (Oct. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/95RR-PDKS.
63. Dirk Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledg-
ers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1361 (2018).
64. Percentage values are authors’ computations.
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Further, drawing only on the ICO vehicle’s own disclosures in our
Whitepaper Database, we could not identify the issuing entity’s country of
origin in 51% and the promoter’s origin in roughly 57% of the whitepapers.
This data demonstrates that ICOs are a global phenomenon, and in this
regard the ICObench Database, the TrackICO Database, and our
Whitepaper Database largely correspond.65 If these numbers do accurately
reflect the global ICO distribution,66 one thing stands out. Given the size of
the U.S. economy and its capital markets, the number for it is remarkably
low. While we will go into details later, this could be due to the strict
enforcement, especially by the SEC, of U.S. financial laws.
The geographical distribution of the Whitepaper Database becomes more
informative when one looks at the top ten ICO jurisdictions in our dataset,
first by ICO numbers and second by ICO volume (capital raised). The list of
the top ten jurisdictions confirms the view that ICOs do not originate geo-
graphically from places in proportion to the size of their capital markets or
economies.
Figure 7: Top Ten ICO jurisdictions by number
(ICObench Database)67
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65. The EU/EEA countries are the origin of 33% of ICOs in TrackICO and 31% in our Whitepaper
Database, the rest of Europe (including Switzerland and Russia) account for respectively 16% and 15%,
and the Asia-Pacific (including Singapore and Australia) for some 23% and 27%; whereas North
America represents some 17% and 15% respectively of ICO issuances. All data relating to complete
datasets only.
66. Due to the lack of a global repository, selection bias could give an incorrect impression. Note that
our sample can be skewed due to the selection of ICOs by the providers of the webpages from which our
dataset was assembled.
67. See Stats and Facts: Numbers of ICOs listed on ICObench per country of origin, ICObench, https://perma
.cc/LBK3-VZL3 (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
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In terms of number of ICOs, we find only some of the key financial mar-
ket jurisdictions. Most ICOs were originating in the United States, ahead of
Singapore, and while the U.K., Russia, Estonia, and Switzerland are signifi-
cant, so are Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Germany, and Australia.
Figure 8 presents the ten most important jurisdictions by capital raised,
sourcing the ICObench Database, by location of the ICO vehicle.
Figure 8: Top Ten ICO jurisdictions by capital raised
(ICObench Database)68
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With regard to Figure 8, we corrected the ICObench data in one impor-
tant aspect: ICObench lists the giant $4 billion EOS ICO as a U.S. ICO,
although the issuing entity is established in the Cayman Islands. Our data
suggests a degree of ICO market concentration in certain jurisdictions. Fur-
ther, while the concentration is noticeable, it is not excessively high, with
approximately 2000 of over 5000 ICOs launched from outside the top ten
jurisdictions.
While it is too early to draw any firm conclusions, the disproportionate
distribution of ICOs among a small number of jurisdictions could be inter-
preted as evidence of an uneven legal playing field, or regulatory arbitrage.69
To the same extent, however, it could be evidence of some locations’ profes-
sional ecosystems nurturing ICOs, in the same way that initial public offer-
ings (“IPOs”) often cluster around a small number of jurisdictions. Given
that the offering of financial products tends to be subject to registration or
68. See id.
69. See e.g., Greg Buchak et al., Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks, 130 J. Fin.
Econ. 453 (2018) (discussing regulatory arbitrage and its impact on the growth of FinTech).
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licensing requirements around the world, we focus on the legal environment
in which ICOs are sold in the next sections.
II. ICO Risks and Policy Considerations
Clearly, based on the analysis in the preceding sections, ICOs raise a range
of issues. In this section, we consider a number of the most significant is-
sues, including information asymmetries, irrational behavior, lack of legal
recourse, and potential systemic risks.
A. Information Asymmetry
The informational situation with most ICOs is uncertain at best. In over
20% of those in the Whitepaper Database, the whitepapers provide merely
technical information about the product or process to be developed. In al-
most 25% of cases the whitepapers do not offer any description of the pro-
ject’s financial circumstances about how and when the capital collected is to
be used. In over 96% of cases the whitepaper is silent on whether the fund-
ing to be provided by participants will be pooled or remain segregated. We
speculate that pooling is widespread, given the lack of the sophisticated
governance structures necessary for asset segregation. Shockingly from the
standpoint of investment decision-making, information on how the initia-
tors plan to further develop the technology that is to be funded is also usu-
ally lacking. The information asymmetry persists after the ICO: we could
find information on actual subscriptions (how much money participants in-
vested in the project) in only 55% of cases in the Whitepaper Database.
In most ICOs in the Whitepaper Database, potential participants are
given so little financial information that their decision to fund the ICO
cannot be based on a rational calculus. In fact, in roughly 40% of the
whitepapers we did not find any financial information, indicating a lack of
financial planning and/or financial solidity. This is not always the case: some
ICOs are professionally documented by lawyers and other advisors clearly
schooled in the customs of the securities markets. However, in most cases,
the information provided is utterly inadequate, and typically consists of a
description of technology that the initiator wishes to develop and often little
else—and even this is not verified in any way. In no cases in the Whitepaper
Database did an external auditor certify the “facts” presented in the
whitepaper.
This is all remarkably different from IPOs. In our view, the only similar-
ity between IPOs and ICOs is the similarity between the acronyms for each,
which could in fact help to mislead investors.
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B. Capital Misallocation
For quite some time, until at least November 2018, it seems that ICO
initiators have been relying on the sort of classic market frenzy that typifies
a bubble.70 While not all ICOs meet their funding targets, oversubscription
is particularly common among the larger, more prominent ICOs.71 Another
indicator of investor sentiment is the estimate that less than 10% of the
tokens acquired by investors can be put to use; the rest are merely available
for trading, indicating purely speculative instruments.72
But even where trading is expected, it is far from certain that ICO partici-
pants will be able to trade their tokens. Transfer issues related to tokens can
cause difficult legal issues in the jurisdictions where the tokens were created;
issues that are for the most part totally overlooked by investors. For instance,
in Switzerland, one of the leading crypto jurisdictions, the transfer usually
requires an assignment in written form. The digital alternative, a signature
by way of a digital signature, is too complicated and cumbersome in prac-
tice, as most ICO participants around the world lack a digital signature as
required by Swiss law.73 Prior to transfer, new solutions to these challenges
must be “invented” and occasion delay and legal uncertainty.
This observable overexcitement is a well-known indicator of the sort of
irrational market behavior seen many times before.74 These bubble charac-
teristics will not only harm individuals who lose money, but also lead to a
misallocation of capital and in fact potentially jeopardize the benefits of us-
ing blockchain based crowdfunding mechanisms more generally—and even
blockchain itself more generally. Rather than channeling money to the most
productive use, as markets should do, there are many signs that many ICOs
70. See generally B. M. Roehner & D. Sornette, “Thermometers” of Speculative Frenzy, 16 Eur. Phys. J.
729 (2000).
71. See Eric Risley, Steve Payne, & John Ascher-Roberts, Most ICOs Fail: A Tale of Two Worlds, Archi-
tect Partners (Sept. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/3BUN-3JDC (arguing that of a database comprising
over 100 ICOs at least 46 ICOs met their funding objective and raised $1.6 billion, or $36 million each,
since June 2017, while 51 ICOs did not reach their funding goals). For instance, in what was then the
world’s largest-to-date ICO, Tezos, collected twenty times the $10 million the founders had initially
envisioned nine months prior to the ICO. See Marc Hochstein, Tezos Founders on ICO Controversy: “This
Will Blow Over,” CoinDesk (Oct. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/3EGR-YY7E. Note that Eric Risley’s
assertion reported herein is not confirmed by our dataset; we lack, however, a sufficient amount of de-
tailed data on subscriptions to make an informed guess. See infra Section II.D. Further, ICO caps seem to
move from time to time, rendering a clear statement on subscriptions difficult.
72. See Kharif, supra note 1 (citing data gathered by Token Report analyzing the use of 226 coin R
sales).
73. In Switzerland, an assignment of contractual rights is required to be in writing or with a qualified
electronic signature: Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911, art. 164
(Switz.). For an English translation, see id., https://perma.cc/YDH3-FMS4zzaza.
74. For the classic treatments, see Charles P. Kindleburger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A
History of Financial Crises (1996); Hyman Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Levy Econ.
Inst., Working Paper No. 74) (1992); C.M. Reinhart & K.S. Rogoff, This Time is Different:
Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2011).
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have channeled money to recipients for their own personal use, in a range of
frauds and scams.75
C. Weak Legal Protections
In only 34.84% of our cases do the whitepapers contain any information
on the applicable law. In 57.68% of cases the whitepapers do not provide
the name of the initiator nor any background information on them, such as
the address. While roughly 20% of the whitepapers collected in the
Whitepaper Database give a name as author of the whitepaper, cases where
the author’s name is identical with the issuer or an officer of the issuer or
where the author’s function in the issuer’s organization is described are ex-
traordinarily rare—less than a dozen in the Database. Without the basic
information as to who stands behind the ICO, private law liability as a cor-
recting factor is severely limited. This is regardless of the law which applies:
any legal action must rest on knowledge of who has collected the considera-
tion. If the parties to a transaction cannot be established with certainty, the
law’s arms are tied.
D. Systemic Risk
With an estimated market capitalization varying from several billion to
several hundred billion U.S. Dollars depending on the date of calculation,
the ICO market may seem to be too small to justify regulatory action based
on systemic risk concerns.
Nonetheless, given that cryptocurrency volume is certainly in the hun-
dreds of billions (the overall market volume of cryptocurrencies is estimated
to be in the $200 billion range)76 and ICOs are a growing component of
this, there is a clear issue of potential concern, as the number of individual
investors have grown rapidly and, at the time of writing, there are not many
signs of high levels of enthusiasm abating, although the number of ICO
issuances declined in the second half of 2018.
75. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real
Estate and Diamonds, supra note 8. The Press Release noted: R
[T]oday [the SEC] charged a businessman and two companies with defrauding investors in a
pair of so-called initial coin offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by investments in real estate
and diamonds. The SEC alleges that [an individual] and his companies have been selling unre-
gistered securities . . . . Alleged misstatements to REcoin investors included that the company
had a ‘team of lawyers, professionals, brokers, and accountants’ that would invest REcoin’s
ICO proceeds into real estate when in fact none had been hired or even consulted. Zaslavskiy
and REcoin allegedly misrepresented they had raised between $2 million and $4 million from
investors when the actual amount is approximately $300,000.
Id.
76. Jemima Kelly, Cryptocurrencies’ Market Cap Hits Record $200 Billion as Bitcoin Soars, Reuters
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/4FNN-9D5L.
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Figure 9: ICOs by numbers per month
(all 3 webscraped databases)77
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Further, in our small sample contained in the Whitepaper Database, in
the 644 (of 1042) ICOs in which we have been able to calculate the consid-
eration collected, the average value collected is $26.60 million based on
ETH and BTC market values at the first day of offering.78 In those 644
ICOs alone, participants have “invested” more than $17.1 billion. Note that
our sample does include some of the prominent and larger ICOs including
Eos and Telegram; so those very large ICOs influence the total strongly.79
Given that the ICObench Database lists 5320 ICOs worldwide through
Feb. 15, 2019, based on these numbers we would “estimate” (or, more accu-
rately, guess) an overall ICO capital raised (total consideration collected)
that is much higher than previously estimated, at something approaching
$140 billion today. If we take the total capital raised according to the data
in the ICObench Database—$24.45 billion collected by 1564 ICOs for
which we have complete observations, giving an average of $15.63 mil-
lion—we still come to a staggering total amount raised of some $80 bil-
77. Compiled from Stats and Facts, ICObench, https://perma.cc/LBK3-VZL3 (last visited Mar. 26,
2019); Reports, ICORating, https://perma.cc/7QAZ-ULUZ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019); ICO Insights,
TrackICO, https://perma.cc/NGG3-TU6V (last visited Mar.26 2019).
78. Many ICOs demand subscriptions to be paid in ETH, and in a handful of cases in BTC. When
ETH or BTC fluctuate in value, so does the volume. For methodological reasons we have taken the
currency market value at the first day of offering since this is the date at which the issuer is able to
determine the volume necessary for the issuer’s project. Further, since in most months of the Whitepaper
Database ETH and BTC had risen, the number we give here is most likely too low.
79. Since we could not confirm the size of ICO RedCab independently, we have excluded the numbers
of RedCab from our sample.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\60-2\HLI203.txt unknown Seq: 25  8-OCT-19 10:17
2019 / ICO Gold Rush 291
lion.80 However, we cannot disregard the fact that we lack data on raised
capital in a third of ICOs in the Whitepaper Database and some 71% of the
ICObench Database. The fact that we lack data on so many ICOs may be
due to the ICO’s total failure with no money being collected at all, or due to
non-disclosure. The former is definitely true for some and the latter for
others. We take the utterly arbitrary, though cautious, approach and assume
that half of the ICOs for which data is missing were total failures and that
the rest reached the lower average amount raised based on the ICORating
Database, coming to a total amount invested in ICOs of roughly $50–55
billion.
Further, even if an estimate only equal to the confirmed capital raised in
the ICObench Database is correct ($24.45 billion), the growth would be
remarkable. Figure 10 shows the monthly capital raised by ICOs through
end of December 2018.
Figure 10: ICO capital raised by month (all three databases,
Jan. 2017–Jan. 2019)81
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Ja
n-
17
Fe
b-
17
M
ar-
17
Ap
r-1
7
M
ay
-1
7
Ju
n-
17
Ju
l-1
7
Au
g-
17
Se
p-
17
Oc
t-1
7
N
ov
-1
7
De
c-1
7
Ja
n-
18
Fe
b-
18
M
ar-
18
Ap
r-1
8
M
ay
-1
8
Ju
n-
18
Ju
l-1
8
Au
g-
18
Se
p-
18
Oc
t-1
8
N
ov
-1
8
De
c-1
8
Ja
n-
19
TrackICO ICObench ICORating
The picture we see in the capital raised is confirmed in our numbers on
ICOs issued per month, as shown in Figure 10.
The numbers lead us to believe that the bubble peaked in the period
between October 2017 and June 2018, with significant enthusiasm still pre-
80. The ICObench Database on capital raised is more informative on these questions than our other
two webscraped databases. The TrackICO Database provides a mere 1223 observations and some of them
are inconclusive (for instance, negative numbers); the average capital raised on TrackICO is $15.1 million
per ICO. The ICORating Database provides 1300 observations, amounting to $22.1 billion collected, an
average of $17 million.
81. See supra note 78.
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sent through August 2018. During that period the risk of overpriced ICOs
was enormous.
These numbers underline how fast FinTech markets can develop. Other
FinTech examples demonstrate how fast a business can move from being
too-small-to-care, to too-big-to-ignore, to too-big-to-fail.82 For instance, the
Bitcoin bubble built up much faster than any other previous case (Figure
11)—and came to a hard landing in early November, 2018 with Bitcoin
prices falling below $3000 (prior to rising again above $10,000 as of Sept.
2019).
Figure 11: Major bubbles since 1990 vs. Bitcoin:
Percentage change83
Money market funds offer an interesting contrast that demonstrates the
rapid growth potential of FinTech businesses. Three of the largest players in
this sector (Vanguard,84 Fidelity,85 and Schwab86) were established in 1975,
1946, and 1971 respectively. Yet, in 2014, Alibaba’s parent company Ant
Financial started to offer a new, fully online fund to its existing customer
82. The concept of a progression from “too-small-to-care” to “too-big-to-fail” was initially developed
by Douglas W. Arner & Ja`nos Barberis, Regulating FinTech Innovation: A Balancing Act Seminar, Asian
Inst. Int’l Fin. L. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/WL9F-6QKH; and was further developed in Doug-
las W. Arner, Ja`nos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47
Geo. J. Int’l L. 1271 (2016).
83. Eric Lam, Mathieu Benhamou, & Adrian Leung, How Bitcoin’s Crash Compares to History’s Biggest
Bubbles: Chart, Bloomberg (Nov. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/U5YF-SS9M.
84. A Remarkable History, Vanguard, https://perma.cc/RC6E-V3W3 (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
85. About Fidelity, Fidelity, https://perma.cc/U898-FWJM (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
86. Company History, Schwab, https://perma.cc/B4W2-MYFS (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
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base.87 Within nine months, Yu’E Bao was the world’s fourth largest money
market mutual fund in the world ($90 billion), on par with these old estab-
lished players,88 and today is the world’s largest money market fund.89
Given the potential risks raised, we turn to a consideration of the existing
legal frameworks potentially operative in the context of ICOs and whether
they are sufficient to address the increasing range of risks arising.
III. Appropriateness of Existing Legal Frameworks
Given the variety of ICOs, a one-size-fits-all legal analysis of ICOs is
simply impossible. Any legal assessment must consider the particularities of
the individual offerings. We begin by considering the forms of potentially
legally relevant conduct, then analyze the potential usefulness of the tradi-
tional private law framework, particularly contract law. From this we con-
sider general frameworks of consumer protection, as these potentially apply
across all forms of ICO, then turn to specific frameworks that may also apply
in the context of financial law and regulation, including those applicable to
crowdfunding.
A. Legally Relevant Conduct
While some ICOs take the form of donations (and thus look similar to
charitable crowdfunding), most ICOs promise some direct benefit in return
for consideration. However, often the benefit is not of a financial nature. In
some cases the token can be used similarly to a license or a gift card (and
thus look similar to rewards-based crowdfunding), and it can grant any set
of rights the initiator chooses to offer.
Depending on how the promise is expressed, the structure of the ICO,
and governing jurisdiction, a contract or partnership, or possibly even a
trust relationship, may arise.90 The important point is that issuing the com-
mitment to the public and accepting the consideration on this basis is le-
gally relevant conduct. The people who make those promises are bound by
their commitments; breach will result in liability. This may seem like stat-
ing the obvious, but we do so because a significant part of the tech commu-
nity appears to believe that blockchain-based conduct falls outside the scope
of the law—a proposition we have argued against elsewhere.91
87. Our History, Ant Financial, https://perma.cc/9CKU-B8JF (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
88. Bill Powell, Alibaba: The $200 Billion ‘Open Sesame’, Newsweek (Sept. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/
C8QQ-2DBP.
89. See Tjun Tang, Yue Zhang & David He, The Rise of Digital Finance in China—New Drivers, New
Game, New Strategy, Boston Consulting Group 4 (2014), https://perma.cc/K8VG-89FB; Shaohui
Tian, Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao Becomes Largest Money Market Fund Globally, Xinhua Net (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://perma.cc/YZ5V-PH6D.
90. See Zetzsche, Buckley, & Arner, Distributed Liability, supra note 63, at 1391–1402. R
91. Id.
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B. General Consumer Protection Legislation
Once qualified as legally relevant action, in most jurisdictions contracts
with the public come along with specific legislation to ensure protection of
consumers. For instance, in the United States, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (“FTC”) is tasked with preventing “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce,” alongside administering a number of more spe-
cific consumer protection laws.92 Such unfair or deceptive acts extend to acts
of foreign commerce which cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable
injury in the United States.93 The FTC is empowered to commence proceed-
ings against persons or corporations who engage in unfair or deceptive con-
duct, and potential remedies include restitution for victims.94 In Germany,
if no more specific legislation applies, German legislation confers private
law prospectus liability as a special case of culpa in contrahendo,95 while
French law subjects any intermediary in goods to rules of promotional com-
munication which come close to prospectus regulation and include a state-
ment “by an independent expert with sound repute and experience that
certifies the existence of the goods on which rights are proposed and advises
on the liquidity of the rights acquired”;96 further, statutory liability and
intermediary regulation applies in this case.97 In Australia, the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) has announced that when
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not apply to an ICO, the offering will
still be subject to Australian consumer laws98 which include prohibitions
against misleading and deceptive, and unconscionable, conduct towards in-
vestors.99 Australian ICOs are likewise governed by general laws against
fraud.100 Similar consumer safeguards exist across the EU and EEA due to
European harmonized consumer protection legislation.101 For instance, in
92. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
93. Id. § 45(a)(4)(A).
94. Id. § 45(b).
95. For the leading case, see German Supreme Court (BGH), 24 Apr. 1978 - II ZR 172/76, BGHZ
71, 284; for details, see Volker Emmerich, in Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen
Gesetzbuch ¶ 135 et seq. (7th ed., 2016).
96. See Barsan, supra note 7, at 61. R
97. See id.
98. Initial Coin Offerings, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://perma.cc/26M2-7CM9.
99. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 18, 20, 21, 22.
100. Denham Sadler, ASIC Set to Move on ICOs, InnovationAus (Sept. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/
L4UH-VUZC.
101. The European consumer protection framework rests on the European Directive on Consumer
Rights (Directive 2011/83/. Of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64) and is supplemented by specific conduct-
or product-related legislation. The European consumer protection framework assumes the perspective
that the asymmetry of information, where the commercial actor knows more about the product or service
than the consumer, is open to abuse, and seeks to add a notion of fairness and good faith into the
contracting between commercial actors and consumers. This is particularly true for technical products
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the U.K. the Consumer Rights Act of 2015, the Consumer Protection Act of 1987,
and the Misrepresentation Act of 1967 are all likely to apply.102 The same is
true for the equivalent consumer protection laws in the rest of Europe. In
the United States a wide range of laws impact on different aspects both
within and without the financial context.
Further, if ICO participants are consumers, private international law will
limit the discretion with which ICO initiators and backers can determine
the applicable law. Under most private international law regimes, contracts
between commercial entities and consumers are subject to the consumer pro-
tection laws in force in the consumer’s jurisdiction of residence, or at least
the rights granted in that jurisdiction are upheld.103 For this reason, con-
sumer law may be well suited to regulate ICOs, although the challenge for
regulators is twofold in this regard: (i) it is very difficult for a regulator to
even know which consumers in its jurisdiction are investing online using
cryptocurrency in ICOs offered abroad, and (ii) if only a small number of
local investors are investing in such ICOs, the required resources to regulate
it may be disproportional to the local impact.
Some in civil law jurisdictions may argue that the acceptance of money in
return for a promise is not a commercial activity; relying, again, on the fact
that the ICO is being issued by a non-commercial entity such as an associa-
tion, club, foundation, or trust. However, the fact a trust, foundation, or
association is acting is no bar to it acting in trade or commerce. Any ongo-
ing project with a profit expectation—either direct or indirect—will suffice
to establish a commercial activity.
Thus, as a common denominator, since ICOs are in most cases offers to
the public, i.e. consumers, by some commercial enterprise where considera-
tion is required in order to participate, the general consumer protection leg-
islation of the relevant jurisdiction will apply.
and services. Under that framework, depending on the details, ICOs could qualify as contracts for services
or goods. If the contract is qualified as financial services, specific financial service legislation applies. See
infra note 104. R
102. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c.15, the Consumer Protection Act 1987, c.43, and the Misrepre-
sentation Act 1967, c.7.
103. In Australia, see ACCC v. Valve Corporation [2016] FCA 196; and Sharon Christensen, Compara-
tive Analysis of Overseas Consumer Policy Frameworks: Part 4, Consumer Law, https://perma.cc/HM8B-
K53Y. For the EU, the Rome I Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 2008 O.J. (L.177) 6)
harmonizes private international law all over the EU. On consumer rights, see Art. 6(1), (2) and Recital
25 of Rome I (“Consumers should be protected by such rules of the country of their habitual residence
that cannot be derogated from by agreement, provided that the consumer contract has been concluded as
a result of the professional pursuing his commercial or professional activities in that particular country.
The same protection should be guaranteed if the professional, while not pursuing his commercial or
professional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, directs his activities
by any means to that country or to several countries, including that country, and the contract is con-
cluded as a result of such activities.”); for instance, in the U.K., pursuant to § 31 and § 47 of the
Consumer Rights Act of 2015, the Act applies to all contracts for the supply of goods or services including
digital content to a U.K. consumer and these provisions cannot be contracted out of. For an analysis of
the private international law dimension of ICOs, see Barsan, supra note 7. R
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In some cases, however, specific legislation could apply and displace the
general consumer legislation. While this is not the case in all jurisdictions
to the same extent, two fields of law are particularly noteworthy in displac-
ing consumer legislation. First, if ICO participation results in a membership
in a company or partnership, company or partnership law could apply in lieu
of consumer protection law.104 Whether this is the case depends on the pri-
vate law qualification of the blockchain participation which we have ex-
plored elsewhere.105 The second important instance of specialized legislation
applicable is financial law, which we consider in the following sections.
C. Financial Law and Regulation
Financial law could assist if it applies. Based on our taxonomy, we argue
that financial law could apply to most self-classified utility tokens and cur-
rency tokens (those that are not pure rewards structures) and most, if not all,
equity tokens. From a functional perspective, financial law generally should
not apply in cases of what are functionally pure donation or rewards struc-
tures. While far from aiming at completeness,106 this section simply demon-
strates that depending on the structuring of the ICO, financial law can apply
and where it can, it usually will and should.
Although the whitepapers in the Whitepaper Database are vague, some
34% of ICOs appear to meet our Currency Token test.107 This however dis-
guises a very wide range of different structures, ranging from mere Bitcoin
replications to payment systems to cryptocurrency ecosystems to a range of
investment structures. Across this spectrum, a range of different financial
regulatory frameworks may come into play, depending on the functional
nature of the currency token involved.
Around the globe, regulators have implemented rules for payment ser-
vices. Some regulators have held that those rules could apply to cryptocur-
rencies and some have excluded such application. While we do not argue
that each issue of currency tokens is subject to existing financial legislation,
at least when an ICO seeking to establish a new cryptocurrency standard is
structured “open-ended” either formally or de facto, so that the entity ac-
cepts fiat money in return for tokens or tokens in return for fiat money,
legislation applicable to cryptocurrency exchanges will likely apply. This
104. See Art. 3(3) lit. d and Recital 9 of the European Directive on Consumer Rights (Council Direc-
tive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64) (“The regulatory aspects to be harmonized should only concern
contracts concluded between traders and consumers. Therefore, this Directive should not affect national
law in the area of contracts relating to employment, contracts relating to succession rights, contracts
relating to family law and contracts relating to the incorporation and organization of companies or
partnership agreements.”)
105. See Zetzsche, Buckley, & Arner, Distributed Liability, supra note 63. R
106. In addition to the laws discussed herein, in most countries AML and CTF rules, and possibly e-
money and money transmitter regulations, are likely to apply.
107. See supra Section I.B.
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could be the legislation applicable to derivative exchanges in the United
States108 or payment services in Luxembourg and Japan.109
Although most whitepapers again are vague, 13% of ICOs in the
Whitepaper Database provide sufficient information to indicate an Equity
Token110 has been issued.111 Regulators around the world have started to
treat those tokens as “securities.” The SEC has held regarding the DAO112
that its ICO would meet the criteria of the Howey test113 and the DAO token
therefore may well be a security. More recently, the SEC has been stating
that ICOs which have the characteristics of securities will be treated as such
and has been bringing related enforcement actions.114
An important development in this area in the United States relates to the
ICO of the MUN token by restaurant review app Munchee. According to
data compiled by CoinSchedule, its offering began on October 31, 2017,
and ended in under two months on December 8, 2017 after the SEC ordered
108. In 2014, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) declared virtual curren-
cies to be a “commodity” subject to oversight under its authority under the Commodity Exchange Act
(“CEA”). See Testimony of CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (Dec. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/S2TS-Q5WU. Based on this clari-
fication, the CFTC has taken various enforcement actions, for instance against unregistered Bitcoin fu-
tures exchanges (BitFinex), see BXFNA Inc. d/b/a Bitfinex, Docket. No. 16–19 (CFTC Jun. 2, 2016),
https://perma.cc/4ACC-DV9K, and a virtual currency Ponzi scheme. On September 21, 2017, the CFTC
filed a complaint in federal court in the Southern District of New York against Nicholas Gelfman and
Gelfman Blueprint, Inc. See Complaint, CFTC v. Gelfman Blueprint, No. 1707181 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2017), https://perma.cc/83T9-ANWZ. For details, see CFTC Backgrounder on Oversight of and Ap-
proach to Virtual Currency Futures Markets, CFTC, (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/NH44-P3CB.
109. Japan has recognized Bitcoin as an official means of payment, see https://perma.cc/C5SM-L73L.
In turn, legislation on payment providers applies. In its position of 14 March 2014, Luxembourg’s CSSF
has announced that it deems the issue of virtual currencies (i.e. tokens with currency characteristics)
outside the scope of financial regulation; however, as soon as business exchanges virtual currencies (i.e.
tokens with currency characteristics) against fiat currency, the exchange is subject to regulation as a
payment service provider under the EU Payments Services Directive or the Electronic Money Institution
Directive, see Jean-Louis Schiltz & Nadia Manzari, Luxembourg, 1 The Virtual Currency Regulation
Review (Nov. 2018), https://perma.cc/3MA6-YHM2 (in the meanwhile, the so-called Bitcoin Commu-
nique of 14 March 2014 has been removed from the CSSF’s website and replaced by the CSSF warning
notice of 14 March 2018, in response to closer supervisory coordination within the EU).
110. On the requirements see supra Section I.B.
111. Notable examples include Taas (Token-as-a-service) selling membership tokens in a closed-end
crypto-asset fund where the token will entitle holders to 50% of the fund’s profits, and payouts rely on a
profit-sharing Ethereum smart contract. Another example includes Overstock/tZERO, where the ICO
“will raise the money through a private placement for accredited investors, and the token will trade on
the company’s own platform. Most notably, it will pay holders a percentage of tZERO’s eventual profits,
distributed quarterly. In other words, a regular old stock dividend.” See Matt Levine, This ICO Looks an
Awful Lot Like a Share Offering, Bloomberg (Oct. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/77UJ-GWU9.
112. See supra note 24. R
113. See SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). According to Howey, what matters for the
qualification of an investment contract, which is a precondition for a security under the U.S. securities
regulation, is whether “the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits
to come solely from the efforts of others.” Thus a token is an investment contract if token holders invest
and expect to make a profit from the entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of others. This condition is
met where token holders are granted participation in a future cash flow of a project or company. Note
that participation rights are not a condition of the Howey test.
114. See SEC, Joint Staff Statement on Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities (July 8, 2019),
https://perma.cc/Z5WK-FX3F.
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its closure.115 There were no allegations of misleading conduct under con-
sumer protection law (a ground that could have been pursued);116 rather, the
SEC relied upon Munchee having offered securities without complying with
securities law, specifically, without filing a registration statement contain-
ing the required disclosure.117 This was despite the whitepaper issued by
Munchee containing a lengthy legal disclaimer, including that “[t]his
White Paper does not constitute the offering of a security.”118
Munchee’s MUN token could be looked at in two ways. On the one hand,
it could be seen as a “utility token” that could be used once the product
came into existence, in a similar way to a pre-ordered product or typical
rewards-based crowdfunding through Kickstarter. On the other hand, con-
sumers were purchasing tokens to fund the creation of a product, and upon
its success, those tokens could increase in value. To determine on which side
of the coin—pun intended—the MUN token fell, the SEC referred to a
number of Facebook promotional posts by Munchee, promising customers
would “most likely get a return” and could “watch[ ] their value increase
over time.”119 The SEC’s analysis gives some clarity to the distinction:
Even if MUN tokens had a practical use at the time of the offer-
ing, it would not preclude the token from being a security. Deter-
mining whether a transaction involves a security does not turn on
labelling—such as characterizing an ICO as involving a “utility
token”—but instead requires an assessment of “the economic re-
alities” underlying a transaction.120
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first instance of an ICO being halted
for reasons other than fraud and misleading conduct in the United States.
This view has been shared by other regulators including Singapore and
Hong Kong,121 and is gathering ground in Europe and an increasing range
of other jurisdictions around the world.122 At the time of writing, discus-
sions aimed at promoting consistency in approaches among regulators are
pending at the International Organization of Securities Commission
115. Munchee Token (MUN), CoinSchedule, https://perma.cc/T6YF-A2GX (last visited Dec. 21,
2017).
116. See Matt Levine, SEC Halts a Real Initial Coin Offering, Bloomberg (Dec. 13, 2017), https://per
ma.cc/355V-J4TV.
117. Munchee Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10445, supra note 8, at 10. R
118. Sanjeev Verma, Nghi Bui, & Chelsea Lam, Munchee Token: A Decentralized Blockchain Based Food
Review/Rating Social Media Platform, https://perma.cc/MG5K-6T6T.
119. Munchee Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10445, supra note 8 at 6 (order instituting R
cease-and-desist proceedings).
120. Id., at 8.
121. For instance, while not specifying details, the Singapore MAS has clarified in its August 1, 2017
statement that securities regulation could apply to ICOs. See Media Release, MAS, supra note 14. The R
same holds true for the British FCA. See Media Release, Financial Conduct Authority, supra note 12. R
122. From the French perspective, see Barsan, supra note 7, at 63 (arguing that equity tokens are R
“other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities” under the MiFID
framework). This view is shared by the authors.
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(“IOSCO”), the international securities regulators’ association. Usually, if a
token is a security, registration and prospectus requirements will apply to
the issuer and ICO, ensuring a level of investor protection.
There still remains the question of how the United States and other courts
will treat these fine distinctions, as Munchee did not dispute the SEC order.
It is likely that such disputes will need to arise and be resolved before we
achieve greater clarification in this area.
Further rules could also apply to the intermediaries involved in issuing,
promoting, trading, clearing, and/or settling the tokens. Beyond these, most
jurisdictions also have rules applying to securities exchanges and related in-
frastructure, such as clearing and settlement. As such, in addition to the
tokens themselves, the exchanges and/or clearing and settlement facilities
dealing with tokens are likely to be caught by related securities regulations
addressing exchanges, clearing, and settlement. For that purpose, besides the
definition of “securities,” it matters whether the investors’ consideration is
put in one bucket from which the right or entitlement granted to the token
holder is purchased or whether the consideration remains separate from the
rights of other token holders. However, virtually all whitepapers in the
Whitepaper Database failed to address this issue. We suspect segregation is
highly unusual given the sophistication and costs which segregation of cli-
ent money requires.
If investor consideration is segregated, the legislation on individual port-
folio management needs to be considered. Here, in addition to portfolio
management obligations, additional criteria are often applied to limit the
scope of financial supervision regarding discretionary portfolio management.
For instance, under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act an investment adviser
is any person who: (1) for compensation (2) is engaged in the business of
providing advice, making recommendations, issuing reports, or furnishing
analyses on securities, either directly or through publications.123 The com-
mon lack of disclosure regarding the involvement, commissions, and fees of
other entities in the ICO makes it difficult to assess who, besides the issuer
as registrant for the purposes of securities regulation, is covered by U.S.
investment law. The European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(“MiFID”) framework regulates portfolio management only if it pertains to
financial instruments. For instance, the European Securities & Markets Au-
thority,124 the German BaFin,125 and the Finanzmarktaufsicht Liechten-
123. See the definition of “investment adviser” of the Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15
U.S.C. § 80b–2 (1940).
124. See European Securities & Markets Authority, Advice on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets
21–27, (Jan. 9 2019), https://perma.cc/9WNB-4E7S (arguing that certain financial legislation is likely
to apply, but each case must be analyzed separately).
125. See Virtuelle Wa¨hrungen/Virtual Currency (VC), BaFin, https://perma.cc/TKU7-WU9D, at
“Erlaubnispflichten” (subjecting all virtual currency trades to legislation applicable to financial instru-
ments; the same principles apply to tokens in general).
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stein126 state that (equity) tokens can be financial instruments. For some
regulators, doubts exist as to whether equity tokens are financial instru-
ments, but this appears increasingly to be a minority view.
In some jurisdictions the situation is different once assets are pooled. In
this case, rules on collective investment could apply. However, the defini-
tion and scope of collective investment rules vary across jurisdictions. For
instance, under the U.S. Investment Company Act an entity must register as
an investment company if the entity: (1) invests in securities, (2) issues
membership interests that are securities, and (3) cannot rely on an exclusion
from the definition of an investment company, including that the entity
does not make, nor propose to make, a public offering of its securities, and
must not have more than 100 members.127 While most ICOs will meet the
second and third criteria, only some ICOs will use the proceeds to invest in
securities even under the broad definition of the Howey test.128 Under the
European Alternative Investment Management Framework, which to our
knowledge applies the broadest scope of collective investment legislation,
the central concept that determines the Alternative Investment Fund Man-
agers Directive’s (“AIFMD”) scope is the Alternative Investment Fund
(“AIF”). The AIFMD uses the term “alternative” in a somewhat misleading
way to include all collective investment undertakings that are not governed
by the UCITS framework and “raise capital from a number of investors,
with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy
for the benefit of those investors.”129 While equity token ICOs are likely to
meet those criteria, the determination of whether there is discretionary third
party fund management and a defined investment policy must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis for which detailed knowledge of the handling of the
ICO consideration and the structure of the issuer, sponsor, and other related
parties is required. Unfortunately, very few whitepapers deliver those de-
tails. In light of this uncertainty it is encouraging and helpful that Austra-
lian regulator ASIC has announced that such equity token arrangements
with a discretionary management structure typically will be classified as
Managed Investment Schemes and regulated under the Corporations Act.130
126. See Faktenblatt “Initial Coin Offering,” FMA (Sept. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/5V4C-JQGC.
127. Investment Company Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3 (1940).
128. See Howey, supra note 113, at 301. R
129. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alter-
native Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regula-
tions (EC) No. 1060/2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010, art. 4(1)(a)(i), 2011 O.J. (L 174). For details, see D.
Zetzsche & C. Preiner, Scope of the AIFMD, in The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Di-
rective 49 et seq, (D. Zetzsche ed. 2d ed., 2015) (International Banking And Finance Law Series, vol.
20). For a criticism on the broad scope, see P. Athanassiou & T. Bullman, The EU’s AIFM Directive and Its
Impact: An Overview, in Research Handbook on Hedge Funds, Private Equity and Alternative
Investments 442 (P. Athanassiou ed., 2012) and D. Busch & L. van Setten, The Alternative Investment
Fund Managers Directive, in Alternative Investment Funds in Europe; Law and Practice 1 (L. van
Setten & D. Busch eds., 2014).
130. See Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Currency, ASIC (May 2018), https://perma.cc/BXD5-PHR5.
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Furthermore, if the value of the coin that is offered depends upon the
value of something else, the coin may fall within the definition of a deriva-
tive in some jurisdictions. In 2014, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) declared virtual currencies to be a “commodity”
subject to oversight under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).131 Based
on this clarification, the CFTC has taken various enforcement actions, for
instance against unregistered Bitcoin futures exchanges132 and a virtual cur-
rency Ponzi scheme.133 In Australia, the definition of a derivative in Section
761D of the Corporations Act is particularly complex, and its nuances are
beyond the scope of this article, but in broad terms if the coin derives its
value from an “underlying instrument” or “reference asset” which could,
among other things, be a share, a share price index, a pair of currencies, a
cryptocurrency, or a commodity, the coin could well be a derivative and any
business offering it would need to hold an Australian financial services
license.134
Finally, as one would expect, most regulators have stated that AML/CTF
regulations apply to ICOs, as well as exchanges and payment systems facili-
tating ICO trading, clearing, and settlement, a view which has now been
confirmed and reinforced by the world’s global AML/CTF standard-setter,
the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”).135
D. Crowdfunding Legislation
The crowdfunding rules that have been established in some jurisdictions
could apply under certain circumstances if the ICO initiators ask for consid-
eration; the application of such rules tends to reduce the regulatory burden.
Since crowdfunding legislation is not uniform across markets, we can merely
summarize the most common aspects.
There are two primary forms of crowdfunding legislation. The first type
modifies existing financial laws for small issuers and brokers of those issuers
with a view to lightening the regulatory burden. Under the second type,
regulators provide thresholds for exemptions from prospectus and other fi-
131. See Timothy Massad, CFTC Chairman, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agricul-
ture, Nutrition and Forestry (Dec. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/9E2D-L64B.
132. See BXFNA, supra note 108. R
133. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and for Civil Monetary Penalties Under
the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission Regulations, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., No. 17-7181 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/9E2D-L64B (On
September 21, 2017, the CFTC filed a complaint in federal district court in the Southern District of New
York against Nicholas Gelfman and Gelfman Blueprint, Inc.).
134. See Australia Corporations Act 2001, § 761D.
135. See Regulation of Virtual Assets, FATF, (Oct. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/XX4S-SJ6W. See also,
FINMA Guidance 04/2017, supra note 17; Media Release, European Securities and Markets Authority, R
ESMA Alerts Firms Involved in Initial Coin Offerings to the Need to Meet Relevant Regulatory Re-
quirements (Nov. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/SR8M-LCY7; Media Release, MAS, supra note 14. R
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nancial law requirements.136 For instance, the laws of the United States,137
Canada,138 Austria,139 and Germany140 limit exemptions from prospectus re-
quirements for crowdfunded projects based on the size of the offering—
ranging from 250,000 to 8 million USD/CAD/EUR—and the amount of
money invested per retail investor, with limits ranging from 1000 to 10,000
in the respective currency per investor depending on the country and the
investors’ wealth. Ninety-five percent of the ICOs in our Whitepaper
Database where the total desired offering size is disclosed exceed the first
threshold. Of course, capital raised can be much lower; according to the
ICObench Database one third of the ICO collects more than $8 million. We
lack the data to make a qualified statement on the second threshold per
investor.141 But we doubt that ICOs in the absence of institutional invest-
ments would reach the total volumes they are raising with capital injections
capped at the 1000/10,000 limit. Evidence suggests that many ICOs have
been characterized by small numbers of large investors, combined with large
numbers of small investors.142
In addition to these, many jurisdictions also provide longstanding exemp-
tions from or relaxations of securities and companies law requirements relat-
ing to prospectuses and other aspects of offerings to small numbers of
investors typically in the form of non-public offerings and/or to professional
investors only. These are often used in the crowdfunding context and spe-
cific crowdfunding legislation often also extends or clarifies aspects of these
sorts of offerings, with the result that many offerings, including ICOs, are
structured in order to fall within these frameworks particularly in the con-
text of offerings open to U.S. investors, with Regulation D structures being
the most commonly used.
136. For an overview of suggested types of regulation in the EU, see Dirk Zetzsche & Christina
Preiner, Cross-Border Crowdfunding: Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for Europe, 19 Eur. Bus. Org. L.
Rev. 217 (2018), https://perma.cc/2T34-2QTB.
137. See Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, SEC (May 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/UH9E-TGQ3 (“Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012
added Securities Act Section 4(a)(6) that provides an exemption from registration for certain crowdfund-
ing transactions. In 2015, the Commission adopted Regulation Crowdfunding [17 CFR Parts 200, 227,
232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274] to implement the requirements of Title III.2”). On regulation, see
Sharon Yamen & Yoel Goldfeder, Equity Crowdfunding—A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Implication of
Crowdfunding Legislation under the JOBS Act, 11 Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 41, 57 (2015).
138. Multilateral CSA Notice 45-316 Start-up Crowdfunding Registration and Prospectus Exemptions, Fi-
nancial and Consumer Affairs Authority (May 14, 2015), https://perma.cc/WA3K-H2LQ.
139. See § 3 Bundesgesetz u¨ber alternative Finanzierungsformen (Alternativfinanzierungsgesetz –
AltFG); Roman Rericha & Raphael Toman, Neuer Rechtsrahmen fu¨r Crowdfunding - Ausbruch aus dem
Regelungsdickicht des Kapitalmarkts?, Z.F.R. 218, 403 (2015).
140. See § 2a Gesetz u¨ber Vermo¨gensanlagen (Vermo¨gensanlagengesetz - VermAnlG); Lars Klo¨hn,
Lars Hornuf & Tobias Schilling, The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German Small Investor Protection Act:
Content, Consequences, Critique, Suggestions, 13 Eur. Comp. L. 57 (2016).
141. Approximately 30% of the ICOs in our Whitepaper Database where data is disclosed impose
minimum investment amounts; these amounts are usually set at very low amounts, e.g. 0.1 ETH.
142. See generally Ru¨diger Fahlenbrach & Marc Frattaroli, ICO investors: Finance Working Paper No. 618/
2019, ECGI (July 2019), https://perma.cc/62DV-FEKQ.
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Australia has taken a different approach to crowdfunding and ICOs. The
Corporations Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 (Cth) came
into effect in September 2017 and stipulates a new regime that requires
companies engaging in crowdfunding to hold an Australian financial ser-
vices licence with an authorization to facilitate crowd-sourced funding activ-
ities.143 However, ASIC has reiterated that ICOs are different from crowd-
sourced funding.144 In its information sheet, ASIC clarifies that “[c]rowd
funding using an ICO is not the same as ‘crowd-sourced funding’ (“CSF”)
regulated by the Corporations Act.”145 ICOs are not covered by the new
regime. As a result, traditional exemptions from offering for private and/or
professional offers may still apply.
E. Summary
For those ICOs which take the functional form of charitable or rewards
tokens, it is likely that financial law will not apply unless it is expressly
extended to do so. At the same time, in any ICO for consideration, applica-
ble contractual and consumer protection frameworks will most certainly ap-
ply. Financial law and regulation may apply to many of those classified as
financial tokens, including most equity tokens and many currency tokens. In
addition, financial law and regulation will arguably apply to many of the
intermediaries engaging in trading, clearing, custody, and settlement of to-
kens which can be classified as financial products.
All in all, we conclude that financial law could apply and should apply to
most of the ICOs in the Whitepaper Database, in particular equity tokens
and any others which are not functionally purely donation or rewards
structures.
In many cases, however, we lack the information necessary to establish
whether the criteria for the application of specific financial law are met.
Moreover, in skilled hands, it is often easy to structure an ICO in such a
way that it lacks one or more technical characteristics necessary for financial
law in a given jurisdiction to apply.146 For instance, if the reference value of
the instrument is not financial in nature, Europe’s MiFID will not apply.
Likewise, in the context of definitions of securities, almost all jurisdictions
continue to have “laundry list” based definitions (i.e. securities are most
commonly defined as stocks, bonds, and/or debentures). In these cases it is
quite possible that many structures which are functionally investment prod-
ucts of some form may fall outside the definition and the resulting regula-
143. Crowd-Sourced Funding, ASIC (Dec. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/4FY3-QNDW.
144. Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), MoneySmart (Dec. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/43WU-Z3GB.
145. See ASIC, supra note 130. R
146. On the SAFT framework in the United States, see Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh & Marco
Santori, The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework, Cooley (Oct. 2, 2017), https://per
ma.cc/5Q4N-9W8Z. On the Conceptual Framework for Blockchain Crypto Property (“BCP”) from
MME in Switzerland, see The New Property on the Block, MME (May 2018), https://perma.cc/WS8B-3FK2.
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tory framework. A small number of jurisdictions follow the U.S. approach in
having a functional test in addition to the laundry list; however, many juris-
dictions still lack the ability to functionally define investment products,
meaning that clever structuring may be used to avoid the technicalities of
securities regulation in many jurisdictions.
IV. Designing an Appropriate Policy and Regulatory Response
From this analysis arises the question of whether or not these existing
frameworks are appropriate to address the risks inherent in a market which
until very recently was clearly a highly hyped market and more broadly to
secure the longer-term benefits that these new structures offer for early stage
financing for blockchain-related and other innovative projects.
In the preceding sections, we have highlighted the large range of excesses
and risks to be found in the ICOs to date. At the same time however it is
worth noting that the combination of blockchain and crowdfunding that lies
at the heart of ICOs has important potential benefits for early stage financ-
ings—a sector whose needs are rarely addressed adequately by our current
financial systems. In this regard, the rise of ICOs is in part a response to a
market failure, in addition to a form of regulatory arbitrage.
ICO tokens are typically offered, stored, and managed on a blockchain.
The core features of blockchain which give it its tremendous potential to
transform existing systems rest on security, transparency, and permanence.
These features mean it offers much for the redesign of existing financial
infrastructure including securities settlement systems and trade finance. In
the context of early stage financing, which often suffers from lack of trans-
parency and concerns over fraud and misbehavior, the combination of secur-
ity, transparency, and permanence potentially allow for much greater reach
(the “democratization” of finance), investor protection (through disclosure
and transparency), and confidence (through protecting investors with secur-
ity of property interests). This combination of features makes the structure
potentially powerful in providing financing for new and innovative ideas,
something that ICOs have most certainly done for blockchain projects—
although, as we have noted, a significant amount of this may have been
unfortunately misallocated on the basis of irrational investor herd behavior
or diverted through fraud and outright theft.
Regulatory responses thus require a careful and thorough consideration of
policy options and impact. We typically see a range of possible approaches
to any financial innovation, from prohibition to laissez-faire approaches and
a spectrum of options in between. We now analyze these before concluding
in favor of a series of nuanced, balanced initiatives involving private order-
ing to reduce information asymmetries and concerted action by financial
regulators.
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A. Prohibition
One option in approaching financial instruments and developments—
new, innovative, or otherwise—is prohibition: making the particular market
or instrument illegal. In the case of ICOs, this is one of a range of possible
options and one which has been in fact adopted in China and South Korea.
Following hard on the heels of the U.S. SEC’s warning against “pump
and dump” ICO schemes,147 in September 2017, China and South Korea
announced their outright bans on ICOs.148 Seven Chinese government regu-
lators, led by the People’s Bank of China, issued a joint statement confirm-
ing ICOs as “unauthorized illegal fundraising activity,”149 and explicitly
treating them as financial fraud and pyramid schemes.150 The document de-
fines an ICO as any fundraising process whereby digital tokens are distrib-
uted to investors making financial contributions in cryptocurrencies.151
Claiming that ICOs have caused severe economic and financial disruption,152
China called for an immediate stop to current ICO activities and for all
completed offerings to arrange refunds.153 It likewise banned all ICO plat-
forms from facilitating new issuances and all financial and payment institu-
tions from dealing in ICOs.154 ICOs that continue to function were
threatened with severe punishment, and contravening exchanges will risk
having their business registration revoked and their website shut down.155
In short, when China decides to prohibit an activity, it certainly does so
decisively, clearly, and comprehensively—although it is reported that pri-
vate trading activity in cryptocurrencies defies the ban.156
In September 2017, South Korea’s Financial Services Commission like-
wise announced its imminent crackdown, explaining that ICOs appear to
have directed market funds in a “non-productive speculative direction.”157
Without defining ICOs, South Korea advised that the ban will encompass
all forms of cryptocurrency fundraising, irrespective of their terminology
147. See Press Release, SEC, Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, (Aug.
28, 2017), https://perma.cc/LK72-5GQC.
148. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text. R
149. Saheli Roy Choudhury, China Bans Companies from Raising Money through ICOs, Asks Local Regula-
tors to Inspect 60 Major Platforms, CNBC (Sept. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/4TZR-4LPY.
150. David Meyer, China’s Central Bank Is Banning Initial Coin Offerings, Fortune (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/86F7-TVT8.
151. Wolfie Zhao, China’s ICO Ban: A Full Translation of Regulator Remarks, CoinDesk (Sept. 5,
2017), https://perma.cc/U3BR-63VT.
152. Id.
153. Chen & Lee, supra note 10. R
154. E.g., Zhao, supra note 151; Choudhury, supra note 149. R
155. Zhao, supra note 151. R
156. Gabriel Wildau, Bitcoin Proves Hard to Kill in China, Financial Times (Nov. 8, 2017), https://
perma.cc/F254-VCNN. (stating that “more of the buying and selling of cryptocurrencies has gravitated
towards the private over-the-counter market”).
157. Simon Sharwood, South Korea Bans Initial Coin Offerings, Register (Sept. 29, 2017), https://per
ma.cc/7589-BYEE.
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and their underlying technology,158 and will also extend to the margin trad-
ing of cryptocurrencies.159 “Stern penalties” will be issued against any busi-
ness or person that breaches this prohibition.160
The Chinese and South Korean solutions have an initial appeal as they
appear to provide legal certainty at low regulatory cost. Upon reflection,
however, an outright ban may be an overly strict response. It overemphasizes
the control of risk and underemphasizes the importance of innovation, and
the great difficulty, in many jurisdictions, that innovative FinTech start-ups
experience in securing funding. Moreover, the legal certainty may in prac-
tice prove to be somewhat spurious. Given how many different forms ICOs
currently take, some may prove permissible unless definitions are drawn ex-
ceptionally broadly.
In addition, historical experience with outright prohibitions on financial
activities suggests that these are usually ineffective and/or counterproduc-
tive. Perhaps the best examples arise in the context of the U.K.’s Bubble Act
of 1720 prohibiting the creation of new joint stock companies or the U.S.
prohibition on onion futures.161 This debate has appeared more recently in
the context of OTC derivatives in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Finan-
cial Crisis, with the result that some jurisdictions, namely the EU, have
created prohibitions in very limited areas such as the naked sovereign
CDS.162
B. From Doing Nothing to Private Ordering: Reducing information asymmetry
At a second level, jurisdictions facing new financial developments could
do nothing, in order to allow markets to develop. The initial approach to
ICOs and cryptocurrencies in most jurisdictions was to do nothing. This
could be seen as an attempt to avoid regulating too early. It could also be
seen potentially as an attempt to sidestep the challenge of new technology
and financial innovation.
Given the very rapid growth of the market we document, this approach
no longer seems appropriate either from the standpoints of potential risks or
the market’s future development. Given that most whitepapers in our
database lack almost all the information required to assess which laws apply,
we suggest the first step must be measures to reduce information asymme-
tries and improve the quality of offerings in the market. This is essential not
only in addressing a core market failure but also in avoiding a potentially
158. Jonathan Ponciano, South Korea Issues Ban on ICOs as Trading Volume Climbs at Nation’s Exchanges,
Forbes (Sept. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/9ZRD-FQ9T.
159. Nakamura, supra note 11. R
160. Cynthia Kim, South Korea Bans Raising Money through Initial Coin Offerings, Reuters (Sept. 29,
2017), https://perma.cc/6CCH-WPXD.
161. Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 S.M.U. L. Rev. 23,
23–57 (2002).
162. Douglas Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation, 89 N. C. L. Rev. 1579,
1579–626 (2011).
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overzealous regulatory response which would result in a market collapse and
the potential discrediting of the structure, as discussed with respect to the
South Sea Bubble and the Bubble Act of 1720, and their stifling impact on
the early development of the joint stock company.
Private ordering—market participants developing frameworks to police
their own behavior out of their own self-interest—is the classic response and
the one we saw in the early nineteenth century as self-regulatory stock ex-
changes emerged to police behavior in the trading of joint stock company
shares, based on the view that if investors felt their interests were secure,
they would be more likely to put their money into the market, which in
terms served the financial interests of the brokers and dealers who owned
and controlled exchanges and controlled the new offerings of stock and other
securities to investors.
In this respect, a similar process is now taking place among ICO industry
participants with a number of participants seeking to develop best practice
guidance in order to improve the quality of the market, and to head off
potentially overzealous regulatory responses. As one example, the SAFT Pro-
ject in the United States seeks to work towards creating an international
formal framework for token sales, and it has published its own whitepaper.
The whitepaper raises a number of legal concerns, most significantly that
most direct presales of tokens likely constitute securities under U.S. law, and
accordingly most ICOs are likely to be in breach of U.S. securities law.163
While the whitepaper only focuses on the implications of U.S. law at the
time of writing, it calls for harmonization of international standards and
expressly calls for the participation of lawyers, investors, and others to col-
laborate on the development of the framework.164 In an interview with
CoinDesk, Marco Santori, one of the individuals behind the Project, said he
sees the whitepaper as “the start of a conversation.”165 And when parts of
the industry themselves call for and develop tools for standardization, this
raises questions as to when and to what extent regulators should step in, if at
all.
In the context of blockchain more generally, a further step is taking place
in the ongoing development of an ISO certification process. This process
would provide for a level of independent certification that an individual
blockchain in the context of an ICO met expected industry standards in
terms of security and other core aspects.
It is an open question however whether private ordering will be sufficient,
particularly in the context of financial ICOs and—based on experience with
the development of other financial innovations—we would suggest that it
163. Batiz-Benet, supra note 146. R
164. The SAFT Project, Saft Project, https://perma.cc/V4Y4-KLGM (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
165. Pete Rizzo, SAFT Arrives: ‘Simple’ Investor Agreement Aims to Remove ICO Complexities, CoinDesk
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/RQA3-NYCF.
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may well not, and that a more direct regulatory response from regulators
and policy makers will be appropriate.
C. Regulatory Warnings
A far less interventionist option than prohibition is simply for the rele-
vant regulator—usually the securities or financial conduct regulator—to is-
sue warnings to the market. This is less severe than prohibition but serves an
important signaling function to markets and participants. Many regulators
have now done so, some repeatedly, with respect to ICOs. These have now
been collected and publicized by IOSCO on its website.166
On July 25, 2017, the U.S. SEC issued a warning to investors about in-
vesting in ICOs.167 This was followed by a series of warnings by other regu-
lators, some in much greater specificity, including by the Monetary
Authority of Singapore on August 10, 2017,168 the Hong Kong Securities
and Futures Commission on September 5, 2017,169 the U.K. Financial Con-
duct Authority on September 12, 2017,170 the Australian Securities and In-
vestments Commission  on  September 28, 2017,171 and the German
regulator, BaFin, on November 9, 2017,172 and again on  November 15,
2017.173 The EU’s ESMA also issued two warnings about ICOs, targeted at
consumers and firms respectively, each on November 13, 2017.174
On August 28, 2017, the U.S. SEC issued an alert warning to investors
about companies touting their investments in ICOs as part of “pump-and-
dump” or other market manipulation schemes to improperly influence their
price.175 The SEC warned that trading suspensions had been imposed on the
stock of some issuers due to claims they had made about their investments
in ICOs, and that investors should exercise caution if current information
about a company’s stock is not available, or if it is a non-reporting com-
pany.176 Investors were warned to be wary of attempts to manipulate the
166. See Regulators’ Statements on Initial Coin Offerings, International Organization of Securities
Commissions, https://perma.cc/GLZ4-TK9A.
167. See Press Release, SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 14. R
168. See Press Release, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Consumer Advisory on Investment Schemes
Involving Digital Tokens (Including Virtual Currencies) (Aug. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/2BHV-
7PPD.
169. See Press Release, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, Statement on Initial Coin
Offerings (Sep. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/GK82-88YQ.
170. See Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, supra note 12. R
171. See Press Release, ASIC, Initial coin offerings and crypto-currency (Sept. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/
9SDM-5WCD.
172. See Press Release, BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, supra note 12. R
173. See Press Release, BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Initial Coin Offerings: High
Risks for Consumers (Nov. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/X5LJ-XMLV.
174. See Press Release, European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), ESMA Alerts Firms
Involved in Initial Coin Offerings to the Need to Meet Relevant Regulatory Requirements (Nov. 13,
2017), https://perma.cc/WA8W-3R85; Press Release, ESMA, ESMA Alerts Investors to the High Risks
of Initial Coin Offerings (Nov. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/NQ59-5ELC.
175. See supra note 147. R
176. Id.
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market by spreading false and misleading information and creating a buying
frenzy, and specifically warned about companies that claim their ICO is
“SEC-compliant” without further explanation.177
Other warnings have emphasized the danger of “whitepapers” provided
by issuers being incomplete, misleading, unaudited, or, in the words of
BaFin, “objectively insufficient.”178 All such warnings also indicate the high
risk of fraud, particularly where the ICO is not regulated, with BaFin
describing this risk as “systemic”;179 the U.K. FCA giving the example of
issuers using funds raised in a different way to that which was promised in
the marketing;180 and ESMA noting that several ICOs have already been
identified as being involved in fraudulent activities.181 The Hong Kong SFC
and ESMA have further warned that the risk of fraud is increased by digital
tokens being anonymously held.182 In addition, BaFin has warned that ver-
ification of the provider’s identity and reputation is typically left to the
consumer alone, and there is no guarantee that any personal data provided
will be protected to German standards.183
The central element to these warnings is that ICOs are largely unregu-
lated in all the above jurisdictions, and investors will have no recourse or
protection if the ICO they invest in is unregulated. A number of regulators,
such as the U.S. SEC, Australia’s ASIC and Hong Kong’s SFC, note that
some ICOs have features that may see them classified as “securities” and
“regulated activities” under securities law, which would then trigger regis-
tration or authorization requirements.
Both BaFin and ESMA warn that ICOs are generally issued by businesses
in their early stages of development, and for this reason there is an inher-
ently high risk of losing all of one’s invested capital. There may also be a
lack of exit options, and no, or highly limited, ability to trade the tokens in
exchange for traditional currency. Unlike the other warnings, ESMA specifi-
cally warns that distributed ledger technology is untested and may be
flawed or subject to hacking.184
ESMA’s notice directed at firms alerts them to the importance of consid-
ering whether their ICO activities constitute “regulated activities.” Where
coins constitute “financial instruments,” it is likely that the firm will be
engaged in regulated activities such as the placement of financial instru-
ments. The warning gives a high-level summary of the EU laws which could
then potentially be applicable to ICOs, for example the requirement for the
publication of a prospectus as opposed to a whitepaper, conduct of business
177. Id.
178. See BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, supra note 12. R
179. Id.
180. See Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, supra note 12. R
181. See supra note 174. R
182. Id. supra note 169. R
183. See supra note 12. R
184. See supra note 174. R
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rules, transparency and due diligence requirements, authorization rules, and
prohibitions on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing.
Such warnings are a standard tool of regulators, and may well have had an
effect in these cases. For instance, it is reported that the proportion of ICOs
per month that missed their goals went up from only 7% in June 2017 to
66% in September 2017.185 This could be attributed to the chain of regula-
tory warnings. However, any warning may cease to be effective when prices
continue to rise. Our sample gives evidence of this fact since the failure rate
of offerings commencing after October 2017 is lower than those previously
commenced. Yet if the warnings were effective, we would expect fewer ICOs
to meet their minimum targets. Further, as depicted in Figures 9 and 10,
more ICOs with large amounts of capital raised came to market after those
warnings than before;186 the bubble expanded despite the warnings.
In summary, just as earlier warnings on cryptocurrencies have had very
limited impact on the Bitcoin hype-cycle long-term,187 we do not believe
the ICO-related warnings will end the gold rush in which ICO entrepre-
neurs seek their fortune. This is because regulatory warnings can serve to
attract undesirable promoters into the ICO market if their message is that
ICOs are unregulated, i.e. that the offerings and sales practice are un-
supervised. Furthermore, the warnings to date have, somewhat remarkably,
failed to address the deficiencies we have identified around the promoters
and issuers of ICOs often being unidentifiable. This deficiency denies inves-
tors their practical private law legal rights. Legally, many ICOs operate in
the dark. This is even worse than the 17th century tulip bubble and similar
events over the centuries—most of the victims then at least knew who had
deprived them of their assets.
Accordingly, given today’s incredibly rapid market development, prohi-
bition appears an unjustified and probably ineffective response, and the
combination of warnings and private ordering will probably also prove in-
sufficient. So we move on to analyze the other options.
D. Enforcing Existing Laws Through Concerted Action
The question then arises as to whether existing financial regulatory
frameworks are sufficient to address this new market. As we suggest in Part
IV above, a wide range of financial regulatory frameworks may apply in the
context of ICOs.
In our framework, the key is to understand the nature of the individual
ICO and its related infrastructure: those with an investment element should
fall within the scope of financial regulatory frameworks, which in many
185. Risley, Payne, & Ascher-Roberts, Most ICOs Fail, supra note 71. R
186. See supra Section II.D.
187. On 13 September 2013, the European Banking Authority issued a warning to consumers on
“Virtual Currencies” such as Bitcoin. See Warning to Consumers on Virtual Currencies, European Banking
Authority (Dec. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/SR64-VEFP.
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cases will be sufficient to address problems which arise and to secure the
viability of the structure once market participants become familiar with the
application of existing frameworks.
Once who is behind the ICO and how the proceeds are to be used are
known, it becomes possible to enforce existing laws based on the functional
nature of any given structure.
Generally speaking, we would suggest—following our analysis above—
that ICOs falling largely into donation or rewards categories should be left
to general legal and consumer protection frameworks, similar to donation
and rewards crowdfunding in many jurisdictions. This however should be
supplemented by private ordering, particularly in the context of industry
certification (i.e. ISO) for blockchains, including those involved in ICOs.
For equity and investment ICOs, these should fall into the scope of finan-
cial law and regulation, with a particular regulatory focus on intermediaries
and market infrastructure providers such as exchanges, where many of the
most high-profile problems have emerged. This topic is beyond the scope of
the current—already lengthy—analysis however.
In the absence of specific legislation to this effect, financial regulators
could promote best practices to that end and interrogate ICOs based on the
assumption that financial legislation applies. In most jurisdictions, financial
regulators have the right to start an investigation where there are reasonable
grounds to assume that financial law does apply.
In order to enhance efficiency, regulators could ask for evidence support-
ing the information provided by the ICO initiator. For instance, auditors
may be required to certify the information sent to regulators.
If the outcome of such an investigation is that financial law does not
apply, the financial regulator could (i) issue a warning notice that a certain
ICO is not regulated by any financial regulator, and (ii) forward the infor-
mation regarding the ICO to the relevant consumer protection agency. If the
outcome is that financial law does apply, financial regulators have all the
traditional enforcement methods at their disposal, ranging from requiring
additional disclosures to outright bans by virtue of cease-and-desist orders188
and emergency asset freezes.189
Since it is not certain whether financial law will apply, concerted action
from public enforcement agencies in a range of domains may be required.
For instance, in addition to financial regulators, information could be shared
with consumer protection agencies as well as the police and criminal investi-
gators in the case of fraud.
The U.S. SEC has been proactive in applying U.S. securities laws to ICOs,
perhaps because of the very large number of reported issuances in the United
188. See Munchee Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10445, supra note 8. R
189. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Emergency Action Halts ICO Scam, supra note 8. R
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States.190 On November 16, 2018, the enforcement actions against Paragon
Coin and Airfox were settled. The SEC in each case took the view that the
tokens were securities and required each company to refund all consideration
raised, plus interest, and pay a $250,000 fine.191 Indeed, if we are to make
predictions, we expect to see other jurisdictions follow the U.S. lead in a
series of such enforcement actions initiated by regulators precisely to send a
message to the market that simply raising money on a blockchain does not
put the activity beyond the purview of relevant laws. In other words, watch
this space, especially in the countries that are hosting the most ICO activity
and wish to be seen as credible regulators.
E. Widening the Scope of Financial Law?
In some circumstances, it may well prove necessary to widen the scope of
financial law and expand existing restrictions. Functional definitions, such
as the Howey test in the United States, are better able to adapt to the chang-
ing marketplace of ICOs. By contrast, when existing financial, legal, and
regulatory frameworks do not apply to currency and investment ICOs, be-
cause of drafting limitations and laundry list definitions, there is a clear
need for changes to bring such ICOs within the scope.
It is probably unnecessary to apply the spectrum of financial regulation to
all ICOs, namely those that are effectively donation or rewards structures.
For example, if one regulates all tokens that grant some rights of use in
return for consideration including true functional utility tokens or rewards
structures, all license-based business models such as online music stores and
software licenses would fall logically into such a regulatory net unless ex-
pressly exempted. Such a step would expand financial law beyond its natural
limits. While consumer protection is an increasingly accepted objective of
financial law, financial regulators may not be the best equipped to combat
wide-ranging consumer fraud, whether or not perpetrated on a blockchain.
What justifies the application of financial law when, for instance, a tulip
bulb is sold via a blockchain-based token instead of in a gardening store?
At the same time, we suggest that all ICOs, regardless of what the token
represents, should be required to provide certain information. This could be
done in the context of private ordering, particularly in industry and/or ISO
guidelines or certifications, but in its absence, legal and regulatory changes
would be needed, likely on a cooperative international basis. These would—
similar to basic prospectus or crowdfunding rules—require the following
information:
• name, address and Legal Entity Identifier of the issuer, plus
names and addresses of key people;
190. See supra note 20; see also supra Figure 7. R
191. Davis Polk Client Memorandum, SEC Debuts Roadmap for Resolving Illegal ICOs (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/ZF8Y-QYMC.
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• target group of the ICO, including a specification of whether
retail or professional participants are targeted, with any re-
gional restrictions;
• details of the participants’ rights and obligations;
• details of how the participants’ consideration is to be treated;
• details of any intermediary that may store the participants’
consideration as well as the mode of storage;
• details of all fees, costs, etc. to be charged against the partici-
pants’ consideration; and
• details on the applicable laws and regulations.
Russian draft legislation for ICO regulation published on January 25, 2018
seeks to reduce information asymmetry.192 In addition to requiring the in-
formation we ask for above,193 it imposes a retail cap of about $900 which is
not unlike the funding caps we have seen in crowdfunding legislation194 and
aims to protect retail participants.
Conclusion
The paucity of research available on ICOs is only matched by the paucity
of information typically available to ICO participants prior to their decision
to participate. More than two thirds of the ICO whitepapers in our dataset
are silent on the issuing entity, the initiators or backers or do not provide
contact details of these parties, and an even greater share do not elaborate on
the applicable law, segregation or pooling of client funds, or the existence of
an external auditor. Accordingly, the decision to invest in them often cannot
be the outcome of a rational calculus. Furthermore, as most recent legislative
initiatives have focused on financial actors, the regulatory situation of many
ICOs is unclear, as they vary in form and structure and will often exist in
very grey areas in terms of regulatory treatment. Based on our analysis, we
believe ICOs will in many cases raise consumer protection issues, but only in
some cases will financial regulators be able to take action.
192. See Russian Finance Ministry Proposes Draft Law on ICO Regulation, Coindesk (Jan. 26, 2018)
https://perma.cc/6M6E-GYHB.
193. See Russian Cryptocurrency and ICO Regulation Starts Taking Shape, Liniya Prava (Jan. 30, 2018)
https://perma.cc/JDP2-MYJG. As LP notes:
The draft law requires token issurers [sic] to disclose certain information prior to the offering
in the forms of public offer and investment memorandum. These documents should include
among other: information on token issuer and its beneficiaries (name, place of business, corpo-
rate structure, website, etc.); the token owners’ rights and the procedure of their exercising; the
price of the issued tokens or the procedure of its determination; information on formation and
access to digital wallets used for the storage of data on purchased tokens; the main purposes of
token issue and spending of funds raised at the ICO; the rules of maintenance of digital trans-
actions registry.
Id.
194. See supra Section IV.D.
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While some regulators have taken decisive steps including prohibition
through an outright ban of ICOs, we prefer a more nuanced approach, espe-
cially as funding to support innovative, high-tech activities is so difficult to
raise in many countries.
Our approach is first to seek to reduce the key issue regarding ICOs,
which is information asymmetry. Private ordering—particularly in the con-
text of industry certification of blockchains and industry guidance on best
practices for ICOs—will have an important role. These approaches may well
be sufficient in the context of non-financial ICOs—i.e. those falling into the
category of donation or rewards-based structures—when combined with ex-
isting private law and consumer protection arrangements. However, we sug-
gest that this is unlikely to be sufficient for equity and investment ICOs.
In the context of these financial ICOs, the starting point should be ex-
isting financial regulatory frameworks. Most financial regulators worldwide
have the right to require information from anyone if there are serious
grounds to believe that financial legislation applies. Acquiring this informa-
tion would enable, as a second step, the enforcement of existing legislation
rigorously in a concerted movement among consumer protection agencies,
financial regulators, and criminal investigators, through emergency asset
freezes in cases of fraudulent ICOs and outright bans in cases of insufficient
disclosure.
In the context of financial regulation, a particular focus should be on
digital asset intermediaries and infrastructure providers such as exchanges,
custodians, and clearing and settlement arrangements, with a distinction
between those catering only to non-financial products (donation and rewards
structures) and those catering to financial products (equity and investment
structures). Exchanges and other intermediaries and infrastructure providers
which cover both should have to meet the stronger regulatory requirements
in the context of financial regulation. Core to these are segregation of assets
and other traditional regulatory requirements, including minimum capital.
This is an area where private ordering will be important but it is also an area
where international standard setting through IOSCO and similar organiza-
tions will have an important role. This however is a topic for another day as
many regulators are still scrambling to understand fully the potential uses,
and impacts, of ICOs and blockchain more generally. This pertains on the
one hand to the impact of private ordering and the necessity of regulating
intermediaries in the cryptoasset world, and to the benefits and downsides of
distributed ledger technology in general.
In jurisdictions where it is unclear whether or not equity and investment
ICOs are covered by the existing financial regulatory framework, changes
will be necessary to make sure that such structures indeed fall into the regu-
latory system. There is a role for international standard setters such as
IOSCO in this context.
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One of the difficulties with many ICOs is their cross-border dimension.
Where consumers from many countries are involved, it will be difficult to
determine a lead regulatory agency and it may be that no agency is inter-
ested in leading given the quantum of the regulator’s costs relative to the
small impact in their jurisdiction. Further, it will be particularly difficult to
establish the relevant jurisdiction as long as it remains unclear who is be-
hind the ICO and where the instigators are domiciled. But this is all the
more reason for regulatory cooperation globally to move forward and de-
velop rules designed at the least to remove the information asymmetry we
have identified. As increasing amounts of money flow into ICOs, some with
highly uncertain prospects, the greater the risk becomes of a very hard land-
ing that will severely damage risk-tolerant, younger tech aficionados, and
thereby severely reduce access to funding for serious tech innovators who
seek to take advantage of blockchain technology to raise funds in creative
and responsible ways.195
195. The over $1.2 billion raised through ICOs in the first half of 2017 by far outstripped venture
capital investment into Blockchain and Bitcoin firms. See Autonomous Next, supra note 3, at 6. Of R
course, the volume varies from country to country, ranging from 0.45% of start-up funding in the
United States to 3.83% in Europe. See Funderbeam, supra note 58, at 7. R
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